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MAKING DO IN MAKING DRUGS: 
INNOVATION POLICY AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURING 
W. NICHOLSON PRICE II* 
Abstract: Despite increasing recalls, contamination events, and shortages, drug 
companies continue to rely on outdated manufacturing plants and processes. Drug 
manufacturing’s inefficiency and lack of innovation stand in stark contrast to drug 
discovery, which is the focus of a calibrated innovation policy that combines pa-
tents and FDA regulation. Pharmaceutical manufacturing lags far behind the inno-
vative techniques found in other industries due to high regulatory barriers and inef-
fective intellectual property incentives. Among other challenges, although manu-
facturers tend to rely on trade secrecy because of the difficulty in enforcing patents 
on manufacturing processes, trade secrecy provides limited incentives for innova-
tion. To increase those incentives, this Article suggests several direct regulatory re-
forms and proposes novel ways to use those reforms to improve innovation policy 
in drug manufacturing and beyond. For example, the FDA could operate a system 
of temporary market exclusivity for manufacturing innovation parallel to the patent 
system. Alternatively, the FDA could require disclosure of manufacturing methods 
to drive the industry from opacity and trade secrecy towards transparency and pa-
tent protection for innovation. Overall, the potentially immense economic and 
health benefits from more innovative manufacturing in the drug industry suggest 
that manufacturing may be a profitable target of innovation policy in other highly 
regulated industries and that manufacturing in general deserves a more prominent 
place in innovation policy and theory. 
INTRODUCTION 
M&M chocolate candies are made with a precision far beyond the capabili-
ties of many drug manufacturers.1 This disparity is surprising because the drug 
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 1 Telephone Interview with John Helferich, Former Senior Vice President of Research & Dev., 
Mars/Masterfoods (May 15, 2013); Telephone Interview with Ajaz Hussain, Former Deputy Dir. of 
the Office of Pharm. Sci., U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Apr. 24, 2013). Manufacturing in the drug in-
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industry is tightly regulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—
which also regulates food production—and the quality of drugs has major impli-
cations for human health. Nevertheless, drug manufacturing is expensive, ineffi-
cient, and non-innovative, which leads to major problems for the healthcare sys-
tem and society as a whole.2 
Drug recalls based on quality issues are one such problem. For example, in 
2011, a record 2329 drug products were recalled.3 Quality issues and contamina-
tion during manufacturing or repackaging caused most of the recalls.4 Similarly, 
in 2009, two drug manufacturers recalled contaminated batches of the crucial 
anesthetic drug propofol, causing long-lasting shortages of the drug and one 
manufacturer’s exit from the market.5 In early 2012, Novartis recalled Excedrin 
and other popular over-the-counter pills because some pill bottles contained 
powerful opiates and broken tablets in addition to their intended contents.6 The 
drugs did not return to the shelves for seven months.7 And in 2012 and 2013, 
fungal contamination of steroid injections made by the New England Com-
pounding Center resulted in forty-eight deaths from fungal meningitis8 and hun-
dreds of additional infections across twenty-three states.9 
                                                                                                                           
dustry has also been characterized as “far behind [that] of potato-chip and laundry-soap makers.” 
Leila Abboud & Scott Hensley, New Prescription for Drug Makers: Update the Plants—After Years of 
Neglect, Industry Focuses on Manufacturing; FDA Acts as a Catalyst, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2003, at 
A1. Little has changed in the past decade. Agnes Shanley, The Pulse of Pharmaceutical Manufactur-
ing, PHARMAMANUFACTURING.COM (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.pharmamanufacturing.com/articles/
2012/050.html, archived at http://perma.cc/J38X-2U3A. 
 2 See infra notes 44–59 and accompanying text (examining the costs of drug manufacturing); 
infra notes 60–91 and accompanying text (describing the lack of innovation in the industry); infra 
notes 142–153 and accompanying text (discussing the industry’s adherence to outdated manufacturing 
techniques out of fear of regulatory approval delay). 
 3 Agnes Shanley, cGMP Judgment Day, PHARMAMANUFACTURING.COM (Dec. 3, 2012), http://
www.pharmamanufacturing.com/articles/2012/159.html, archived at http://perma.cc/KN9Q-N99U. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Valerie Jensen & Bob A. Rappaport, The Reality of Drug Shortages—The Case of the Injectable 
Agent Propofol, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 806, 806 (2010). 
 6 Eryn Brown, Recall: Mix-up Pulls Excedrin, Bufferin, Other Meds off Shelves, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 
9, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/09/news/la-heb-novartis-excedrin-recall-painkillers-
20120109, archived at http://perma.cc/TTF9-ZW6Z. 
 7 Jie Jenny Zou, Excedrin Production Resumes, WALL ST. J. (July 26, 2012, 4:54 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/health/2012/07/26/excedrin-production-resumes, archived at http://perma.cc/FUB3-
M85J. 
 8 Lethal Medicine Linked to Meningitis Outbreak, 60 MINUTES (Mar. 10, 2013), http://www.
cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57573470/lethal-medicine-linked-to-meningitis-outbreak, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4SFA-S4KK. 
 9 Jordan Paradise, Follow-on Biologics: Implementation Challenges and Opportunities: Fore-
word, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 502–03 (2011); Lethal Medicine Linked to Meningitis Outbreak, 
supra note 8. 
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Drug manufacturing problems are not limited to recalls and contamination. 
Over 15% of the nation’s soaring healthcare costs are spent on drugs.10 And up 
to $50 billion is wasted on inefficient drug manufacturing annually.11 Overall, 
manufacturing costs comprise anywhere from 15% to over 50% of firm-level 
revenue.12 Reducing manufacturing expenses would create tremendous positive 
social externalities, whether the savings were passed on to consumers (and the 
government) through lower drug prices or reinvested into research and develop-
ment (R&D) to increase future health gains. Depending on how the firm uses the 
savings, a 20% reduction could create an annual consumer surplus worth $47.4 
billion to $574 billion.13 Despite these potential benefits, firms frequently use 
outdated production techniques and old manufacturing plants with little innova-
tive change to increase efficiency or quality.14 
This lack of innovation in drug manufacturing is striking because the drug 
industry is otherwise a major and successful focus of innovation policy.15 Intel-
lectual property and the FDA’s regulatory barriers create carefully calibrated in-
centives for firms to discover and develop drugs.16 In addition to their independ-
                                                                                                                           
 10 Katie Thomas, U.S. Drug Costs Dropped in 2012, but Rises Loom, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2013, 
at A1. Note that in 2012, drug expenditures actually dropped by around 1%. Id. This was due to many 
popular drugs’ patents expiring at the same time, allowing generics to flood the market and, thus, 
lowering drug expenditures. Id. This phenomena has been designated the “patent cliff,” and is not 
expected to continue. Id. 
 11 Pradeep Suresh & Prabir K. Basu, Improving Pharmaceutical Product Development and Manu-
facturing: Impact on Cost of Drug Development and Cost of Goods Sold of Pharmaceuticals, 3 J. 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 175, 186 (2008). See generally infra notes 92–107 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the potential cost-saving benefits of improving manufacturing processes). 
 12 See infra notes 44–59 and accompanying text (analyzing the differing manufacturing costs 
across the drug industry’s three main sectors: brand-name small-molecule drugs, generic small-
molecule drugs, and biologics). 
 13 J.A. Vernon et al., Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Efficiency, Drug Prices, and Public Health: 
Examining the Causal Links, 41 DRUG INFO. J. 229, 236 (2007). See generally infra notes 92–107 and 
accompanying text (discussing the potential benefits of improving manufacturing processes). 
 14 See infra notes 60–91 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of innovation in pharmaceu-
tical manufacturing and the resulting negative effects on the drug industry). 
 15 See infra notes 223–229 and accompanying text (describing the role patents play in encourag-
ing drug discovery); infra notes 270–283 and accompanying text (noting the FDA’s power to grant 
market-exclusivity to certain drug producers and this power’s role in spurring drug R&D). This Article 
uses the term “innovation” broadly, to include not only technological innovation, but also innovation 
in business practices. See generally Daniel F. Spulber, Should Business Method Inventions Be Patent-
able?, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 265, 271–75 (2011) (describing how “business method inventions” are 
important to economic growth). This Article also uses “innovation” to refer to the development of 
costly bodies of information related to and underlying other forms of innovation. See generally Re-
becca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
345, 366–72 (2007) (characterizing the FDA’s innovation policy role in promoting the creation of 
costly information on drug safety and efficacy). 
 16 See infra notes 130–136 and accompanying text (explaining that FDA regulations induce drug 
discovery by creating barriers to entry that prevent competitors from entering the market); infra notes 
205–212 and accompanying text (discussing the roles of patents and FDA regulatory exclusivity in 
promoting drug discovery). 
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ent effects, intellectual property and regulation work together because regulation 
not only creates hurdles to overcome, but also enhances patent incentives.17 
Although the effects of innovation policy on drug discovery and develop-
ment have been well studied, policy and academic debates about innovation in-
centives have largely ignored the important role of manufacturing innovation.18 
One of the goals of this Article is to secure a place for manufacturing in innova-
tion theory. Manufacturing is important, but usually unproblematic. Innovative 
products require successful manufacture and distribution to create significant 
social welfare gains. In most industries, firms have sufficient incentives and face 
sufficiently low hurdles to innovative manufacturing.19 As a result, firms in other 
industries improve manufacturing and reliably provide marketable products.20 
Yet, in the pharmaceutical industry, manufacturing has suffered from innovation 
policy myopia. Patent law does not reward manufacturing innovation and FDA 
regulations impede it, so firms tend not to innovate.21 If manufacturing is better 
understood through innovation theory, then policy prescriptions can use that the-
ory to improve innovation in manufacturing in general and in the pharmaceutical 
industry in particular. 
Incentives are much weaker for innovative manufacturing than for innova-
tive drug discovery. Both patents and FDA action create periods of market ex-
clusivity for new drugs.22 Furthermore, the FDA approval process itself 
strengthens the market power of drug patents.23 Patents on manufacturing pro-
cesses, however, are very hard to enforce and do not receive a boost from the 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 130–136 and accompanying text; infra notes 205–212 and accompanying text. 
 18 For a sample of the extensive literature focusing on innovation policy on drug discovery and 
development, but not addressing manufacturing innovation, see generally, for example, Harvey E. 
Bale Jr., Patent Protection and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 95 (1996); 
Ron A. Bouchard et al., The Pas de Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation and Innovation: Who’s Lead-
ing Whom, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1461 (2009); Brian R. Bouggy, Follow-on Biologics Legislation: 
Striking a Balance Between Innovation and Affordability, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 367 (2010); Eisen-
berg, supra note 15; Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Be-
tween Innovation and Competition, 7 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 479 (2008); Christopher M. Hol-
man, Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on Pharmaceutical Innovation, 76 MO. L. REV. 
645 (2011); Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in Interna-
tional Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193 (2005). 
 19 See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (noting that the drug industry still lags in imple-
menting modern manufacturing techniques that were developed in the 1980s and readily adopted in 
other industries). 
 20 See infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 122–283 and accompanying text (outlining how intellectual property and the 
FDA fail to incentivize manufacturing innovation in the pharmaceutical industry). 
 22 See infra notes 223–283 and accompanying text (discussing the roles and shortcomings of 
patents and FDA market exclusivity in encouraging manufacturing innovation). 
 23 See infra notes 136, 223–269 and accompanying text (discussing patents and how FDA ap-
proval requirements strengthen the exclusivity of patents). 
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FDA.24 Firms therefore forego manufacturing patents for trade secrets. But trade 
secrets block cumulative innovation and may insufficiently reward some im-
portant types of manufacturing innovation.25 Other industries may also face in-
adequate incentives for manufacturing innovation but do not face the intense 
regulatory barriers present in the pharmaceutical industry. 
The drug industry’s regulatory barriers also slow manufacturing innovation. 
Rather than enhancing and fine-tuning innovation incentives, FDA regulations 
obstruct manufacturing innovation by raising significant barriers to innovative 
change, both before and after drug approval.26 Firms avoid introducing new 
technologies when seeking approval based on historically justified fears of pre-
approval delay from reviewers leery of new technology.27 After approval, chang-
es to manufacturing processes face procedural hurdles that can wholly prevent 
continual process improvement.28 Substantive barriers also arise from regulatory 
lock-in of both drug characteristics and associated manufacturing methods at an 
early stage in drug development, before firms optimize manufacturing.29 Pervad-
ing the innovative landscape is one final barrier: a form of self-imposed techno-
logical standard created by industry-wide adherence to technical examples in 
FDA guidance documents.30 
Broader than any specific failure of innovation or regulation is the mis-
match between the two. The classic justification for intellectual property is that it 
increases innovation incentives above the socially suboptimal investment base-
line;31 this occurs against an assumed background of regulatory freedom to in-
novate. When intellectual property incentives are less effective, but innovation is 
substantially unhampered by regulation, firms can still innovate at or slightly 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See infra notes 226–240 and accompanying text (noting the difficulties of enforcing process 
patents); infra notes 270–283 and accompanying text (explaining that, unlike drug discoveries, FDA 
regulations do not create market exclusivity for manufacturing innovations). 
 25 See infra notes 284–331 and accompanying text (analyzing trade secret’s role and shortcomings 
in promoting manufacturing innovation). 
 26 See infra notes 130–204 and accompanying text (explaining how FDA regulations create hur-
dles to manufacturing innovation in the pharmaceutical industry). 
 27 See infra notes 142–154 and accompanying text (discussing preapproval barriers for new drug 
applications and describing the FDA’s resistance to accepting a new manufacturing technique: high 
performance liquid chromatography (“HPLC”)). 
 28 See infra notes 171–183 and accompanying text (discussing postapproval filing requirements 
for major, moderate, and minor process changes). 
 29 See infra notes 184–204 and accompanying text (discussing postapproval FDA regulatory lock-
in). 
 30 See infra notes 155–167 and accompanying text (providing an example of the industry’s perva-
sive blind adherence to FDA examples by describing the development of the industry’s three-batch 
standard for certain tests resulting from the FDA’s use of three batches in a guidance document). 
 31 Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent 
Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30–31 (1991); see infra notes 223–269 and accompanying text (discussing 
patent structure and why patents fail to incentivize manufacturing innovation in the pharmaceutical 
industry). 
496 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:491 
above that baseline. This is the case with manufacturing methods in many indus-
tries. And when regulatory restrictions are intense and costly, but policy rewards 
are high, firms still innovate because policy-driven benefits of innovation exceed 
the costs. This is the case with the development of new drugs because develop-
ment requires costly clinical trials, but receives effective patent protection and 
regulatory market exclusivity. But when regulatory burdens to innovation are 
high and exclusivity incentives are weak and ineffective, the net motivation to 
innovate is low. This is the case with drug manufacturing. 
As a result of ineffective innovation policy, drug manufacturing has been 
close to stagnant for decades, lagging far behind the innovative manufacturing 
advances of other industries. Even the regulatory standards now imposed reflect 
a poorly controlled state of manufacturing. For instance, the amount of an active 
ingredient in a drug can typically vary by as much as +/–10%, so the difference 
between two approved tablets in the same bottle could be as much as 20%.32 
There is no simple complete solution to these problems. Given the broad 
mismatch between regulatory hurdles and incentives, solutions could lessen hur-
dles, increase incentives, or do both. The relatively straightforward first step 
would be to lessen current regulatory barriers to innovation to the extent possible 
while letting the FDA ensure drug safety. This will itself allow more innovation, 
but is unlikely to be enough, in part because even efficient and well-functioning 
regulatory oversight imposes significant hurdles in the heavily regulated drug 
industry. 
More dramatically, the FDA could deliberately shape innovation incentives. 
The effect of regulation on innovation has been studied before,33 but previous 
studies have paid much less attention to the way regulation could be used as a 
policy lever to actively drive innovation by changing incentives.34 The FDA ad-
ministers incentives for drug discovery and development already.35 This Article 
suggests two possible approaches to expand and flexibly apply the FDA’s incen-
tive-shaping approach to manufacturing innovation. First, a system of FDA-
mediated market exclusivity, parallel to that for drug approval, could be institut-
                                                                                                                           
 32 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: INVESTIGATING 
OUT-OF-SPECIFICATION (OOS) TEST RESULTS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTION 10 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/ucm070287.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
JC4-6NJ4. 
 33 This literature is especially extensive in the area of environmental regulation. See generally, 
e.g., Jens Hemmelskamp, Environmental Policy Instruments and Their Effects on Innovation, 5 EUR. 
PLAN. STUD. 177 (1997); Wesley A. Magat, The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Innovation, 
43 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4 (1979); Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative 
Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256 (1981); Margaret R. Taylor et al., Regulation 
as the Mother of Innovation: The Case of SO2 Control, 27 L. &. POL’Y 348 (2005). 
 34 A few articles have been written in the context of the FDA and drug discovery. See generally, 
e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 15; William E. Ridgway, Note, Realizing Two-Tiered Innovation Policy 
Through Drug Regulation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1221 (2006). 
 35 Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 359–64, 366–72. 
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ed. Alternatively, the FDA could mandate disclosure to drive the industry to-
wards far greater transparency about manufacturing methods, destroying the ef-
fectiveness of trade secrecy but replacing it with a newly enhanced ability to 
enforce manufacturing process patents. 
Part I of this Article evaluates the state of the pharmaceutical manufactur-
ing industry, describing the costs of making drugs, failures of innovation, and 
potential benefits of increased innovation.36 Part II then describes the regulatory 
and intellectual property reasons for manufacturing stagnation.37 Finally, Part III 
suggests potential regulatory solutions to increase innovation, including both 
pure regulatory and incentive-shifting possibilities.38 
I. THE STATE OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURING 
Manufacturing is either the largest or second-largest expense for pharma-
ceutical firms.39 Nonetheless, drug manufacturing is surprisingly inefficient, lag-
ging significantly behind the modernized manufacturing techniques of other in-
dustries; the industry was recently characterized as being “in the dark ages with 
respect to . . . efficiency.”40 This manufacturing lag is a major problem. The drug 
industry could save tens of billions of dollars annually by modernizing manufac-
turing, with even larger social welfare benefits. 
Section A of this Part discusses the high costs of manufacturing across the 
industry’s three main segments.41 Section B analyzes the various causes and ef-
fects of the industry’s current lack of manufacturing innovation.42 Finally, Sec-
tion C discusses the potential benefits from updating manufacturing processes, 
including reduced costs and improved quality.43 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See infra notes 39–121 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 122–331 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 332–444 and accompanying text. 
 39 Prabir Basu et al., Analysis of Manufacturing Costs in Pharmaceutical Companies, 3 J. PHAR-
MACEUTICAL INNOVATION 30, 33 fig.1 (2008); see infra notes 44–59 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing manufacturing costs). For brand-name and biologics companies, sales and marketing are generally 
the highest costs, and for generics, manufacturing is by far the largest cost. See infra notes 44–59 and 
accompanying text. 
 40 Joanne Eglovitch, Regulatory Relief Explored for QbD Use in Post-Approval Changes, GOLD 
SHEET (Aug. 30, 2012, 12:00 AM), available at http://www.elsevierbi.com/publications/the-gold-
sheet/46/8/regulatory-relief-explored-for-qbd-use-in-postapproval-changes (quoting Moheb Nasr, Vice 
President of Regulatory Chemistry and Manufacturing Controls Strategy for GlaxoSmithKline and 
former Director at the FDA’s Office of New Drug Quality Assessment). 
 41 See infra notes 44–59 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 60–91 and accompanying text. 
 43 See infra notes 92–121 and accompanying text. 
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A. High Costs of Manufacturing Across the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Widespread misperceptions that drug manufacturing is very inexpensive44 
arise from a focus on marginal costs.45 Marginal costs are frequently very low, 
especially for blockbuster small-molecule drugs.46 Other drugs, however, typi-
cally have higher marginal costs.47 Furthermore, the industry as a whole has very 
high fixed costs, including building factories, maintaining quality control, and 
depreciating capital assets; these more inclusive expenses, reported as “Cost of 
Goods Sold” (COGS) as a percentage of total revenue, comprise a large fraction 
of pharmaceutical companies’ costs.48 
Manufacturing costs differ across the drug industry’s three segments: 
brand-name production of small-molecule drugs, generic production of small-
molecule drugs, and primarily brand-name production of biologics. For research-
oriented brand-name pharmaceutical firms, COGS were approximately 26% of 
sales between 1994 and 2006.49 Generics spent more on manufacturing, averag-
                                                                                                                           
 44 See Jennifer S. Bard, What to Do When You Can’t Hear the Whistleblowing: A Proposal to 
Protect the Public’s Health by Providing Whistleblower Protection for Medical Researchers, 9 IND. 
HEALTH L. REV. 1, 34 (2012) (noting that “once a drug is developed, it costs very little to manufac-
ture”); Irwin I. Park, Extinguishing Exclusive Marketing Rights: Interpreting the Medical Innovation 
Prize Fund Act of 2011, 22 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 183, 214 n.217 (2011) (arguing 
that drug innovation prizes could increase profits, “assuming that manufacturing costs are minimal”). 
 45 Marginal costs measure the cost of manufacturing one extra pill. Cf. J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel 
F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851, 868 
n.43 (1996) (defining “marginal cost”). For example, marginal cost is the price of going from the one-
millionth pill to the one-million-and-first pill. Cf. id. Fixed and marginal production costs vary by 
drug, and precise production costs are generally unavailable. Ernst R. Berndt et al., Information, Mar-
keting, and Pricing in the U.S. Antiulcer Drug Market, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 100, 100 (1995). 
 46 See Outterson, supra note 18, at 253 (noting that although most drug manufacturers do not 
disclose patented drugs’ marginal manufacturing costs, differential pricing ratios can be used as a 
proxy: “[They] currently exceed 30:1 in [anti-retroviral] drugs, implying marginal costs of production 
in the range of 3 to 4%.”). 
 47 See Berndt et al., supra note 45, at 100 (suggesting that for one group of anti-ulcer drugs, mar-
ginal production costs ranged from 10–25% of the drugs’ price). 
 48 See infra notes 49–59 and accompanying text (explaining the various COGS of different indus-
try segments and noting that COGS can account for over half of some firms’ revenues). 
 49 Basu et al., supra note 39, at 33 fig.1; see also Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost 
of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 
PLOS MED. 29, 29–30 (2008), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/fetchObject.action?
uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0050001&representation=PDF, archived at http://
perma.cc/8KA6-M66F (reporting that, according to one study, ten of the largest global pharmaceutical 
firms spent 30% of total revenue on COGS and 12% on R&D between 1996 and 2005). Large drug 
companies’ annual reports support these survey-based conclusions. See, e.g., GLAXOSMITHKLINE, DO 
MORE, FEEL BETTER, LIVE LONGER: ANNUAL REPORT FOR SHAREHOLDERS 136–37 (2011), 
http://www.gsk.com/content/dam/gsk/globals/documents/pdf/GSK-Annual-Report-2011.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/VBZ9-DJV2 (reporting COGS of 26.8% in 2011 and 26.7% in 2010); PFIZER, 2012 
FINANCIAL REPORT 15 (2012), http://www.pfizer.com/files/annualreport/2012/financial/financial2012.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/MQ8J-3GAL (reporting COGS of 21.6% in 2011 and 22.7% in 2010). 
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ing 52%.50 Generics’ COGS are a higher fraction of total sales for several rea-
sons, including lower consumer prices51 and lower R&D, compliance, and mar-
keting costs.52 Although it is not a priori obvious that absolute (as opposed to 
fractional) manufacturing costs should be lower for generic companies,53 and 
although hard numbers are difficult to obtain, industry experts nevertheless sug-
gest that generics also have lower per-unit costs.54 
Biologics also face high manufacturing costs.55 The manufacture of biolog-
ics has been characterized as “highly complex and requir[ing] high capital in-
vestments.”56 Both fixed and variable manufacturing costs are higher for biolog-
                                                                                                                           
 50 Basu et al., supra note 39, at 33 fig.1; see also TEVA PHARM. INDUST. LTD., FORM 20-F: AN-
NUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 12 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 6 
(2011), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MTI2OTcyfEN
oaWxkSUQ9LTF8VHlwZT0z&t=1, archived at http://perma.cc/YD8P-Z7NT (reporting COGS as 
48% of sales in 2011 and similar levels in the previous four years.). 
 51 Lower consumer prices mean that if absolute manufacturing costs are the same, COGS as a 
fraction of total sales will be higher. For instance, if it costs $1 to make a pill that sells for $10 as a 
brand-name pill but $2 as a generic pill, COGS would be 50% of total sales for the generic but only 
10% for the brand. 
 52 Basu et al., supra note 39, at 33–34. 
 53 For example, brand-name manufacturers could potentially optimize the manufacturing process 
over years of experience with the drug. See Christopher S. Ponder, Comment, The Dubious Value of 
Hatch-Waxman Exclusivity, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 555, 575 (2008) (“In the generic market, the pioneer 
manufacturer likely enjoys lower manufacturing costs due to valuable experience gained from produc-
ing the drug for the duration of its patent.”). Empirically, however, incremental innovation tends not to 
occur, and older techniques persist instead. See Prabir Basu, Today’s Hidden Crisis in Health Care: 
The State of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, RPM REP., Sept. 2008, at 2, available at http://www.
nipte.org/docs/RPM_REPORT.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XR2-WFSD (“The interplay of tight 
FDA regulation to ensure product safety, the high cost of re-approval of process innovations and inad-
equate science-based understanding of pharmaceutical science and manufacturing ensures that once a 
manufacturing process is approved, it is left substantially unchanged for the duration of the product 
life.”); see also infra notes 60–91 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of innovation in phar-
maceutical manufacturing). 
 54 See Mark Herlant, Restoring the Balance: A Strategic Role for Operations, in THE PATHWAY TO 
OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 64, 68 (Thomas Friedli et al. eds., 
2010) (“To date, no research-based ‘big pharma’ company has been able to build a COGS model that 
would allow it to compete in the generics arena.”). 
 55 Biologics include therapeutic proteins and other products of living sources. Paradise, supra 
note 9, at 502; see also 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2006) (defining “biological product” as, “a virus, thera-
peutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, 
protein . . . , or analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine . . . , applicable to 
the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings”). 
 56 OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 153 (Thomas Friedli et al. 
eds., 2006) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE]. Biologics can be modified in various and some-
times unpredictable ways during their synthesis; for example, biologics can vary across production 
systems or batches, and even in a single production batch. Paradise, supra note 9, at 502–03 (noting 
that production and storage processes cause biologics to have high variations rates than other types of 
drugs); see Michael Butler, Animal Cell Cultures: Recent Achievements and Perspectives in the Pro-
duction of Biopharmaceuticals, 68 APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY & BIOTECHNOLOGY 283, 286–88 (2005) 
(discussing variations in glycans tests). 
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ics than for small-molecule drugs.57 Fractional manufacturing costs are lower, at 
14% of total sales,58 because biologics companies spend significantly more on 
R&D than small-molecule companies and because the prices for biologics are 
generally very high, leading to higher fractional operating income.59 Even 
though manufacturing comprises a smaller portion of expenses for biologics, it 
remains a significant factor in the dynamics of market entry and market mainte-
nance. 
Overall, drug manufacturing makes up a very large portion of industry ex-
penses across the different types of pharmaceutical firms. Despite the size of 
manufacturing costs, manufacturing is inefficient and non-innovative, which 
drives costs even higher. 
B. Lack of Innovation of Manufacturing Processes 
Pharmaceutical manufacturing has lagged far behind other industries in 
adopting modern manufacturing techniques.60 These modern techniques, includ-
ing continuous improvement of processes, quality management throughout pro-
duction, constant monitoring of production parameters, and waste reduction, 
were developed principally beginning in the 1980s and spread through automo-
tive, consumer goods, and other industries,61 but generally not the drug indus-
try.62 This lag has resulted in overall poor operational performance in drug man-
ufacturing,63 characterized by specific related deficiencies—including excessive 
process rigidity, old plants and equipment, slow development and adoption of 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Compare Henry Grabowski et al., The Market for Follow-On Biologics: How Will It Evolve?, 
25 HEALTH AFF. 1291, 1294 (2006) (reporting that in 2006, an average plant for biologic production 
was estimated to cost $250–450 million to construct), with Pharma Closed How Many US Plants This 
Year?, EXPERTBRIEFINGS.COM (Dec. 14, 2011, 1:07 PM), http://www.expertbriefings.com/news/
pharma-closed-how-many-us-plants-this-year/, archived at http://perma.cc/FR8Z-5L5F (reporting that 
an average plant for small-molecule drug production can be built for $41 million). The materials for 
biologics manufacturing also cost many times that of small molecules. Grabowski et al., supra, at 
1294. 
 58 Basu et al., supra note 39, at 33 fig.1. 
 59 See id. at 34 figs.3 & 4. One 1994–2006 study found that R&D typically comprised 26% of 
total sales for biologics companies versus 13% and 8% for brand-name and generic small molecule 
drug companies, respectively. Id. at 34 fig.3. The same study found that operating income for biolog-
ics companies comprised 22% of the companies’ total sales, versus 19% and 12% for brand-name and 
generics, respectively. Id. at 34 fig.4. 
 60 OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 24. 
 61 Id. at 30–33. 
 62 Id. at 24–25; see also Lawrence Yu, Pharmaceutical Quality by Design: Product and Process 
Development, Understanding, and Control, 25 PHARMACEUTICAL RES. 781, 786 (2008) (noting that 
in 2008, pharmaceutical development scientists had “just begun” using process simulation to support 
manufacturing optimization and product development, even though process simulation had been “suc-
cessfully used in the chemical and oil industries since the early 1960s”). 
 63 See Herlant, supra note 54, at 67 (noting very large gaps between pharmaceutical company 
performance and “best in class” performance on cycle times, stock turn, and equipment use, and 
smaller gaps with respect to time in full and reworking products). 
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novel technology, underutilized equipment and inefficient procedures, a lack of 
continuous process monitoring, and significant waste.64 
Process rigidity, where manufacturing parameters remain static over the 
lifetime of the drug,65 is a defining characteristic of pharmaceutical manufactur-
ing, as opposed to other industries, where flexibility and continuous improve-
ment are crucial for efficient and innovative manufacturing.66 FDA oversight 
contributes to this process rigidity.67 Because clinical trials are the foundation of 
the FDA’s initial determination that an approved drug is safe and effective, for-
mulations and manufacturing techniques used in mass production must match 
the processes used in the clinical trials.68 But regulatory submissions on drug 
characteristics are typically based on relatively limited and shallow infor-
mation.69 Thus, the manufacturing conditions described in the initial submission 
become somewhat arbitrary regulatory commitments that must be kept in future 
manufacturing.70 
Process rigidity also encourages drug manufacturers to continue using out-
dated production lines and older equipment. The industry’s factories have been 
generally described as “in terrible shape.”71 Many facilities and primary produc-
tion lines are quite old. Some have been operating continually since the 1960s, 
frequently running twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, with only lim-
ited upgrades.72 Outdated and overworked facilities increase the risk of contami-
nation of sterile products, require “repeated or extensive manual interventions,” 
(further increasing the risk of contamination), and can even shed glass or metal 
shavings into the product.73 One FDA Warning Letter to Ben Venue Labs, issued 
after a 2011 plant inspection, described a plant with “severely dented” doors 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See Prabir Basu, The Current State of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing—In Search of Science, in 
THE PATHWAY TO OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 54, at 
77, 79. 
 65 OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 32. 
 66 Id. at 48; see also THE PATHWAY TO OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY, supra note 54, at 29 (noting that the pharmaceutical industry lags on continuous improve-
ment). 
 67 See infra notes 130–204 and accompanying text (discussing the hurdles to manufacturing inno-
vation that FDA regulations create). 
 68 OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 32. 
 69 Id. at 25. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Katie Thomas, Lapses at Big Drug Factories Add to Shortages and Danger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
18, 2012, at A1 (quoting Erin Fox, manager of the Drug Information Service at the University of 
Utah). 
 72 J. Woodcock & M. Wosinska, Economic and Technological Drivers of Generic Sterile Injecta-
ble Drug Shortages, 93 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOLGY THERAPEUTICS 170, 173 (2013). 
 73 Id. 
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shedding rust into drug containers, rusty tools used for sterile line setup, and a 
roof leaking water into sterile areas.74 
Outdated facilities and process rigidity also reflect a broader trend of slow 
development and adoption of novel technologies in drug manufacturing. The 
industry spends little on developing new manufacturing technologies and is slow 
to adopt new processes once developed.75 For example, the sorts of academic-
industry collaborations that have become common both in drug discovery and in 
other industries’ manufacturing sectors are just starting to emerge for pharma-
ceutical manufacturing.76 One clear sign of the technological lag in drug manu-
facturing is that the industry still produces drugs step-by-step, in large batches, 
as opposed to using continuous manufacturing (i.e., start-to-finish production 
lines) like almost every other industry.77 
In addition to process rigidity, industry manufacturing procedures are plagued 
with inefficiencies. Inefficiencies appear in the utilization of capital resources,78 
                                                                                                                           
 74 Warning Letter from the U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Thomas J. Murphy, President & CEO, 
Ben Venue Labs., Inc. 1–4, 19, 20 (May 25, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/ORA/ORAElectronicReadingRoom/UCM275843.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/ZH6T-KPQM. 
 75 See infra notes 130–154 and accompanying text (explaining that many firms do not adopt pro-
cess innovations out of fear of delayed FDA approval). 
 76 See Todd Wallack, Novartis to Give MIT $65m to Find New Way to Produce Drugs, BOS. 
GLOBE, Sept. 28, 2007, at A1 (reporting the development of the Novartis-MIT Center for Continuous 
Manufacturing and illustrating its novelty); About C-SOPS, C-SOPS, http://ercforsops.org/about-c-
sops, archived at http://perma.cc/AW28-ASJA (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (describing the Rutgers’ 
Engineering Research Center for Structured Organic Particulate Systems). See generally Daniel X. 
Yang & Yunsoo A. Kim, Helping Science and Drug Development to Succeed Through Pharma-
Academia Partnerships, 86 YALE J. BIO. MED. 429 (2013) (discussing academic-industry collabora-
tions in drug discovery); Carlton Chen, Leveraging Opportunities Through University-Industry Col-
laboration, U. CONN. (July 30, 2013), http://news.engr.uconn.edu/manufacturers-roundtable-leveraging-
mfg-opportunities-through-university-industry-collaboration.php, archived at http://perma.cc/ME55-
AYU3 (discussing the University of Connecticut’s recent Manufacturers Roundtable meeting that was 
held to encourage further collaborations with the University of Connecticut in various manufacturing 
sectors). 
 77 See Wallack, supra note 76; About C-SOPS, supra note 76. Both the Novartis-MIT Center for 
Continuous Manufacturing and Rutgers’ Engineering Research Center for Structured Organic Particulate 
Systems focus on developing continuous manufacturing methods. See Novartis-MIT Center for Continu-
ous Manufacturing, MASS. INST. TECHN., http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2012/07/26/excedrin-production-
resumes, archived at http://perma.cc/FUB3-M85J (last visited Feb. 10, 2014); Technology Platforms, C-
SOPS, http://ercforsops.org/about-c-sops/technology-platforms, archived at http://perma.cc/33UY-49JM 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2014). 
 78 Relative to other industries, equipment is underutilized in the pharmaceutical manufacturing in-
dustry. In a survey of European drug plants, nearly two-thirds of plant equipment was idle at any given 
time. OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 60; see Herlant, supra note 54, at 67. Overall 
equipment effectiveness (the percentage of scheduled runtime a piece of equipment produces good prod-
ucts) averages 20–30% in the drug manufacturing industry, compared to 50–90% in the automotive, 
consumer packaged goods, aerospace, and computer industries. Bowman Cox, Attention Turns to the 
Business Case for Quality by Design, GOLD SHEET (Jan. 1, 2009, 5:00 AM), available at http://
www.elsevierbi.com/publications/the-gold-sheet/43/001/attention-turns-to-the-business-case-for-quality-
by-design. 
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management of finished product inventories79 and raw material stocks,80 and labor 
practices.81 
Quality tests in the drug industry are also outdated and inefficient. Pharma-
ceutical manufacturers ensure quality by discretely testing batches of drugs, typ-
ically at the end of production stages.82 These discrete tests identify out-of-
specification products that must be discarded.83 But discrete testing is less effi-
cient than continuously monitoring product characteristics to guarantee quality 
throughout production.84 As a result, pharmaceutical manufacturers have much 
higher error rates than permitted by regulation in final products. The combina-
tion of a lack of ongoing quality management and very strict final product stand-
ards leads to very high levels of unacceptable final products relative to other in-
dustries. Typically, between seven and 16% of products must be discarded in the 
drug industry.85 Other industries with well-developed manufacturing, even those 
with less strict final product standards, usually have manufacturing processes 
that are more robust throughout production and thus require less end-testing and 
fewer product discards.86 The unpredictability inherent in stringent end-oriented 
testing has both economic and human costs. A faulty product that makes it to the 
end of the production line before testing can contribute to drug shortages if the 
                                                                                                                           
 79 Pharmaceutical stock turns over on average 1–2 times per year, whereas consumer goods typi-
cally turn over 16–20 times per year and high tech goods can turn over as high as 50 times per year. 
OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 24–25. Slow turnover creates high inventory costs, 
likely justified by a desire to avoid losing any possible sales. Id. at 63. 
 80 Xiaojun Wang, Inventory Management in a Pharmaceutical Company: Minimizing Discard 
Practices 25–28 (Sept. 2010) (unpublished Master of Engineering in Manufacturing dissertation, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with Massachusetts Institute of Technology Library). Ex-
cessive stocks of materials may be overcautiously (by the company’s own standards) maintained to 
avoid any possibility of production delays, which can result in significantly higher inventory costs and 
rates of discarding expired materials. See id. at 54–59; see also id. (finding in one case study that 
ingredient stocks at an active pharmaceutical ingredient plant could be reduced by 43% while still 
meeting the company’s own stringent requirements for backup supplies). 
 81 Labor value-add time (how much time is spent adding value to the product) is typically around 
20% in a pharmaceutical plant, whereas in the automotive industry, value-add time is typically around 
60–70% or higher. Cox, supra note 78. The ratio of direct labor (people actually making drugs) to 
indirect labor (management, quality control, and engineering) is roughly ten times lower than in other 
industries. Id.; see OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 57. 
 82 See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 75. 
 83 See id. 
 84 Id. Continuous monitoring is more efficient because it allows manufacturers to spot errors and 
make corrections quicker. Anne Trafton, Continuous Drug Manufacturing Offers Speed, Lowers 
Costs, MASS. INST. TECH. (Mar. 12, 2012), http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2012/manufacturing-pharma
ceuticals-0312.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8T7T-7AL8. Note that continuous monitoring is dif-
ferent from continuous manufacturing. Continuous monitoring involves constantly measuring product 
quality during manufacturing processes. Continuous manufacturing describes the difference between a 
constant-in/constant-out assembly-line system and one where large batches of a product go through 
separate and sequential process steps. See Wallack, supra note 76. 
 85 OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 76. 
 86 Id. 
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batch is discarded, or product recalls if testing fails to catch the problem before 
distribution.87 
Quality testing also takes a long time and disrupts manufacturing.88 This 
disruption is magnified by FDA regulations requiring that any out-of-
specification test results be addressed by a full investigation before retesting to 
validate the result or continuing the manufacturing process.89 Quality control 
thus consumes a large portion of manufacturing time and creates tremendous 
variability in cycle time, which itself leads to other inefficiencies. In one plant 
with an average production time of 250 days, a stunning 237 of those days were 
used for quality assurance and quality control.90 
This dire picture is not universal in the drug industry. Some industry leaders 
have embraced some modern manufacturing techniques. Those leaders that have 
pursued manufacturing innovation have experienced concomitant gains in effi-
ciency and continuous control over drug quality.91 But even those leaders face 
substantial barriers to innovative change. And overall, drug manufacturing con-
tinues to be highly inefficient and non-innovative compared both with other in-
dustries and with earlier stages in the life of a drug. These inefficiencies and out-
dated techniques have major implications for the industry, the healthcare system, 
and society as a whole. 
C. Potential Benefits from Improving Manufacturing Processes 
Manufacturing innovation would lead to major improvements. The poten-
tial efficiency gains have frankly stunning monetary and health implications. 
Gains to drug quality and reliability have less quantifiable but still important 
implications for the industry and society. 
1. Reduced Costs 
Tens of billions of dollars are spent annually on manufacturing inefficien-
cies. Efficiency increases consequently carry large potential benefits. One study 
found potential yearly savings of $19 million in COGS for a single billion-dollar 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See Yu, supra note 62, at 782; infra notes 108–121 and accompanying text (discussing recent 
contamination events and drug shortages). 
 88 OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 72. 
 89 21 C.F.R. § 211.192 (2013) (“Any unexplained discrepancy . . . or the failure of a batch or any 
of its components to meet any of its specifications shall be thoroughly investigated, whether or not the 
batch has already been distributed . . . .”). 
 90 OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 125–26. Similarly, the process for manufactur-
ing the main active ingredient in Schering-Plough/Merck’s cholesterol drug Vytorin reportedly in-
cludes 21.7 days of manufacturing and 63 days of testing and quality control/quality assurance. Wang, 
supra note 80, at 14. 
 91 See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 82–130. 
2014] Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing 505 
blockbuster drug, with lifetime revenue increases of $577 million.92 Estimated 
potential savings to the pharmaceutical industry worldwide range from $15 to 
$90 billion yearly.93 
Another study analyzed the potential social gains from industry-wide drug 
manufacturing improvements.94 The study described two possible boundary sce-
narios resulting from various hypothetical increases in manufacturing efficiency, 
which in turn would decrease the marginal cost of producing drugs.95 In the first 
scenario, lower manufacturing costs result in lower prices to consumers.96 This 
should occur in fully competitive markets where marginal price equals marginal 
cost at equilibrium.97 But even in monopolies or oligopolies, where profit-
maximizing firms have the ability to price above marginal cost, orthodox eco-
nomics predicts that lower manufacturing costs will decrease prices, resulting in 
consumer surplus.98 In this orthodox model, an industry-wide 20% reduction in 
pharmaceutical manufacturing costs, totaling between $20 and $30 billion,99 
would lead to estimated yearly consumer surplus gains of $47.4 billion in the 
United States.100 
In the study’s second boundary case, manufacturers stray from the orthodox 
market model by holding prices steady.101 The resulting increased cash flow 
from sales would tend, both theoretically and empirically, to increase firm R&D 
expenditures.102 An industry-wide 20% decrease in manufacturing costs, if pric-
                                                                                                                           
 92 Suresh & Basu, supra note 11, at 186. Revenue increases include the effect of earlier peak drug 
availability, measured over the lifetime of the drug. See id. at 185–86. 
 93 Id. One early-moving major drug company, GlaxoSmithKline, has estimated that its own ongo-
ing program of optimizing manufacturing operations will deliver annual pretax savings of approxi-
mately £2.8 billion ($4.5 billion) by 2014. GLAXOSMITHKLINE, supra note 49, at 55. The program 
cost approximately £4.9 billion ($7.7 billion) to implement. Id. 
 94 Vernon et al., supra note 13, at 229–30, 237. 
 95 Id. Considering these to be “boundary scenarios,” the author of the study hypothesized that “the 
actual effect of improved manufacturing efficiency [would] (possibly) exist[] somewhere between the 
two model projections. Id. at 230. 
 96 Id. at 230–34. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Suresh & Basu, supra note 11, at 186. 
 100 Vernon et al., supra note 13, at 234 tbl.1. This study also calculates the total benefit of these 
savings in all future years, assuming other factors hold constant, and finds a total value of $676.7 
billion. Id. 
 101 Id. at 234–37. 
 102 John A. Vernon, Examining the Link Between Price Regulation and Pharmaceutical R&D 
Investment, 14 HEALTH ECON. 1, 3, 6 (2005) (noting that reducing price regulation encourages firms 
to invest more in R&D); see F. M. Scherer, The Link Between Gross Profitability and Pharmaceutical 
R&D Spending, 20 HEALTH AFF. 216, 220 (2001) (explaining that firms are rent-seeking with R&D 
and are thus more likely to invest in R&D as profit opportunities increase). The intuition behind this 
result is that firms invest in R&D by funding projects in order from most promising to least promising 
until the marginal expected return for a project equals the marginal cost of additional capital. See 
Vernon et al., supra note 13, at 235–37. When a firm’s cash flow increases, as here through lower 
manufacturing costs and steady prices, the available cash has a lower cost of capital than borrowing 
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es hold constant, would lead to a $3.9 billion one-time increase in annual R&D 
flows.103 The present value of that increase, taking into account patterns of R&D 
growth over time, is $110.4 billion.104 Increases in pharmaceutical R&D, in turn, 
have large effects on social welfare because newly discovered drugs can improve 
health outcomes and improve life expectancy. One scholar estimated that each 
$1345 invested in pharmaceutical R&D leads to health increases with a value of 
one U.S. life-year.105 Using this estimate, a 20% reduction in manufacturing 
costs would result in an annual gain of 5.7 million life-years through increases in 
R&D spending.106 Using a benchmark approximate value of $100,000 for a life-
year, the annual value of this health increase would be $574 billion.107 
Even though the study’s two estimates are stylized, the social gains of even 
moderately increased pharmaceutical manufacturing efficiency are easily meas-
ured in the tens or hundreds of billions of dollars. 
2. Improved Quality 
In addition to lowering costs, manufacturing innovation can improve drug 
quality. Innovative processes that ensure quality throughout the production pro-
cess can increase final drug quality more cheaply and effectively than increased 
end-stage testing, largely because drug production is currently far less developed 
and exacting than drug testing.108 Resulting improvements in drug quality could 
improve human health and well-being by reducing quality failures such as con-
tamination events and drug shortages. 
Contamination events and other major quality control failures cause loss of 
life and decrease confidence in the industry, both of which may lead to even fur-
ther health ramifications.109 Such quality failures include the Chinese heparin 
                                                                                                                           
funds or issuing new equity. Id. Accordingly, more R&D projects are worth funding. Vernon et al., 
supra note 13, at 235–37. This logic relies on the theoretical assumption that capital markets are im-
perfect. 
 103 Vernon et al., supra note 13, at 236 tbl.2. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Frank R. Lichtenberg, Sources of U.S. Longevity Increase, 1960–1997, at 17, (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8755, 2002), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8755.pdf?new_window=1, archived at http://perma.cc/9TMZ-EX8G. 
 106 See Vernon et al., supra note 13, at 236 tbl.3. Vernon calculated an all-years present value gain 
of 82.1 million life years; using his estimated 7% discount rate, this gives a yearly gain of 5.7 million 
life-years. Id. 
 107 See id. The study calculated an $8.2 trillion present value of the all-years increase, which 
equates to a yearly gain of approximately $574 billion using a 7% discount rate. Id. 
 108 See Basu, supra note 64, at 78. 
 109 See Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong, U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Address at the 
2013 CBI Pharmaceutical Compliance Congress (Jan. 29, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.
justice.gov/iso/opa/civil/speeches/2013/civ-speech-130129.html, archived at http://perma.cc/RV9E-
6YPP) (“Weak enforcement that encourages deviations from [good manufacturing practices] and 
noncompliance in this area affects the entire industry, as it erodes the confidence of the American 
public in our drug system.”); see also Larry Rosania, Heparin Crisis 2008: A Tipping Point for In-
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crisis of 2008 that killed over 81 people110 and the 2012 meningitis outbreak 
from contaminated steroids, which has so far killed 64 people and sickened 751 
more across 20 states.111 Using outdated and decrepit manufacturing equipment 
directly contributes to the likelihood of contamination events and quality prob-
lems.112 
Failing to innovate also contributes. Greater process understanding, in-
creased in-line monitoring, and more modern techniques all could create higher-
quality and safer drugs. For instance, some modern techniques can monitor the 
uniformity and concentration of ingredients in drug tablets, rather than merely 
testing a very few samples at the end of production.113 Most companies, howev-
er, have not embraced this type of innovation, in part for the reasons described 
below. 
Improving manufacturing could also help alleviate drug shortages. Drug 
shortages are an ongoing and increasing problem.114 Shortages are estimated to 
                                                                                                                           
creased FDA Enforcement in the Pharma Sector?, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 489, 491–92 (2010) (de-
scribing loss of life resulting from quality control failures). 
 110 Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Identifies Tainted Heparin in 11 Countries, N.Y. TIMES (late ed.), Apr. 
22, 2008, at 1 (reporting 81 deaths in the crisis); see also Rosania, supra note 109, at 491–91 (attrib-
uting 150 deaths to the crisis). 
 111 Multistate Outbreak of Fungal Meningitis and Other Infections—Case Count, CDC, http://
www.cdc.gov/hai/outbreaks/meningitis-map-large.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9GER-VSL2 (last 
updated Oct. 23, 2013); see Andrew Pollack & Sabrina Tavernise, Oversight Failures Documented in 
Meningitis Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2012, at A27. The affected steroids were manufactured in 
a compounding pharmacy not directly subjected to FDA regulation. Id. The industry-wide innovation 
deficiency created by regulation and intellectual property failures, however, directly impacts the tech-
nologies and techniques available to compounding pharmacies as well as more typical drug manufac-
turers. 
 112 See Margaret Hamburg, Speech to the Annual Meeting of the Generic Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers Association (Feb. 22, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/
ucm340870.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/C3UK-UESA) (observing that there have been “too many 
quality lapses throughout the pharmaceutical industry over the past few years[,]” connecting quality 
problems to “aging facilities,” and noting that “instilling quality is equally important for . . . future pipe-
line[s] as well”). 
 113 See Eunah Lee et al., High-Throughput Analysis of Pharmaceutical Tablet Content Uniformity 
by Near-Infrared Chemical Imaging, 21 SPECTROSCOPY 24, 24–25 (2006), available at http://www.
spectroscopyonline.com/spectroscopy/data/articlestandard/spectroscopy/472006/387571/article.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3YF-84K8 (discussing near-infrared chemical imaging, which measures 
active ingredients in drug tablets without destroying the samples). 
 114 See Kevin Born, Time and Money: An Analysis of the Legislative Efforts to Address the Pre-
scription Drug Shortage Crisis in America, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 235, 237–38 (2012) (noting that in 
2011, there were 267 such drug shortages, up from 211 in 2010, 166 in 2009, and 61 in 2005); see also 
id. (noting that this trend is expected to continue, with even more shortages expected in the future). A 
drug shortage is “a situation in which the total supply of all clinically interchangeable versions of an 
FDA-regulated drug is inadequate to meet the current or projected demand at the user level.” CTR. 
FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, MAPP 6003.1, MANUAL OF POLICIES & PROCEDURES 7 
(2012). 
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have monetary costs totaling $416 million per year115 and unknown human costs 
in terms of patients dying, suffering adverse reactions, or delaying treatment.116 
In 2011, 73% of shortages were sterile injectable drugs,117 many of which are 
important front-line cancer treatments in widespread use, but shortages exist 
across all dosage forms.118 The ultimate causes of drug shortages are debated, 
but most are closely linked to manufacturing problems.119 In 2011, 46% of drugs 
shortages were caused by quality issues, “including bacterial or mold contamina-
tion, tablet disintegration, and the presence of foreign particles such as glass or 
metal in vials.”120 Manufacturing delay or capacity issues caused another 19% of 
shortages, such as “when embedded quality problems with one product force 
closure of a production line or facility for repairs, resulting in shortage of other 
products (even those for which no quality problems had been detected).”121 As a 
result, manufacturing innovation and improvement to increase robustness, flexi-
bility, and drug quality could significantly help shortages. 
The human costs of manufacturing failures are large and apparently in-
creasing. Improving innovation in manufacturing could help to reduce the inci-
dence of manufacturing quality failures, especially those failures resulting in 
harmful contamination events and direct human injury. Manufacturing innova-
tion and the resulting increase in quality and flexibility could also reduce the 
incidence of drug shortages. Presumably, more reliable and better controlled 
manufacturing could increase drug uniformity and quality, which could then im-
                                                                                                                           
 115 See COLEEN CHERICI ET AL., NAVIGATING DRUG SHORTAGES IN AMERICAN HEALTHCARE: A 
PREMIER HEALTHCARE ALLIANCE ANALYSIS 6 (2011), https://www.premierinc.com/about/news/11-
mar/drug-shortage-white-paper-3-28-11.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LJB2-LAD6 (indicating that 
shortages result in increased payments for drugs and shipping of approximately $200 million annual-
ly); Rola Kaakeh et al., Impact of Drug Shortages on U.S. Health Systems, 68 AM. J. HEALTH-SYSTEM 
PHARMACY 1811, 1814 (2011) (reporting that increased labor costs of time spent by pharmacists, 
doctors, and nurses dealing with drug shortages cost an estimated additional $216 million annually). 
 116 See Born, supra note 114, at 239 (discussing the many potential adverse consequences patients 
may face when doctors are forced to alter their medications due to drug shortages); Drug Shortages: 
National Survey Reveals High Level of Frustration, Low Level of Safety, ISMP MEDICATION SAFETY 
ALERT!: ACUTE CARE EDITION, (Inst. for Safe Medication Practices, Horsham, Pa.), Sept. 23, 2010, at 
1, 1, available at http://www.ismp.org/newsletters/acutecare/articles/20100923.asp, archived at http://
perma.cc/WK3-2YH4 (same). 
 117 S.L. Kweder & S. Dill, Drug Shortages: The Cycle of Quantity and Quality, 93 CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY THERAPEUTICS 245, 246 fig.1 (2013); Woodcock & Wosinska, supra note 72, at 170. 
 118 Bruce A. Chabner, Drug Shortages—A Critical Challenge for the Generic-Drug Market, 365 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2147, 2147–48 (2011). 
 119 Woodcock & Wosinska, supra note 72, at 170–71; see CHERICI ET AL., supra note 115, at 2–3; 
Chabner, supra note 118, at 2147–48. 
 120 Kweder & Dill, supra note 117, at 247. 
 121 Id. Twelve percent of shortages were due to discontinuations, which may also result from 
quality problems. Id. at 247 fig.2; see Patricia M. Danzon & Nuno Sousa Pereira, Vaccine Supply: 
Effects of Regulation and Competition, 18 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 239, 265 (2011) (noting that because 
vaccine manufactures are “[f]aced with low prices and volatile demand, [they] have chosen to exit 
rather than incur the significant costs of bringing manufacturing capacity up to the high standards 
required”). 
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prove the predictability of medical treatment. Overall, manufacturing innovation 
has the potential for major human health and industry cost benefits. 
II. THE FAILURE OF INNOVATION POLICY IN PHARMACEUTICAL 
MANUFACTURING 
Innovation in drug manufacturing is vital for a well-functioning health sys-
tem, and the innovation landscape is deeply shaped by legal rules and regulatory 
structures. The limited literature that previously has addressed innovation prob-
lems in pharmaceutical manufacturing has focused largely on firm culture and 
executive focus.122 Although these explanations undoubtedly contain some truth, 
they do not address the role that legal rules and innovation policy play in slow-
ing innovation. As a practical consequence of that theoretical lacuna, calibrated 
policy successfully drives innovation in drug discovery and development, but 
not in drug manufacturing. 
Similar to drug discovery and development, innovations in drug manufac-
turing are frequently expensive to develop but relatively easy to copy once 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See, e.g., OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 32 (“Manufacturing has not been seen 
as central in producing competitive advantage.”); Bowman Cox, Slogging Toward Quality by Design, 
GOLD SHEET (Dec. 20, 2012, 12:00 PM), available at http://www.elsevierbi.com/publications/the-
gold-sheet/46/12/slogging-toward-quality-by-design (citing a report by Ted Fuhr, pharmaceutical 
consultant at McKinsey & Co.). Other institutional factors—identified in these sources, as well as in 
conversations and interviews with pharmaceutical industry consultants, executives, and in-house and 
outside counsel—may involve the typical background of pharmaceutical company executives in R&D 
or sales rather than in manufacturing, the greater ease of promoting R&D advances to shareholders 
over manufacturing improvements, and differences in training between manufacturing/operations 
personnel and R&D personnel. See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 32; Cox, supra. In 
addition, given the realities of limited management capital and attention, management may focus 
exclusively on incentives for drug discovery innovation, which tend to exceed those available for 
manufacturing innovation. See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 155 (noting that “[a]s 
long as gross margins on drugs are as high as today, questions on intellectual property are overriding 
the question of manufacturing costs.”); see also Girish Malhotra, Financial Justification for QbD and 
Cost of Regulation Compliance, PROFITABILITY THROUGH SIMPLICITY (May 22, 2012, 12:33 PM), 
http://pharmachemicalscoatings.blogspot.com/2012/05/financial-justification-for-qbd-and.html, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/HEZ6-GCGH (“Strategic manufacturing, technology innovation, higher 
profits and shortened time to market are the QbD drivers. Industry should have been there fifty plus 
years ago. [But, t]he current blockbuster business model absorbed all of the manufacturing deficien-
cies. Shareholders got accustomed to the fast paced introduction of new drugs and profits.”). Further-
more, blockbusters may have both higher potential profits and lower manufacturing costs than other 
drugs. Matthew Harper, The Death of the Blockbuster Drug, FORBES (May 28, 2010, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sciencebiz/2010/05/28/the-death-of-the-blockbuster-drug/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/HZ5X-5K99. High volume means fixed costs are lower per unit. Special Report: 
Blockbuster Death and Growth of Generics, PHARMKON (Feb. 11, 2013), http://pharmakon.me/
2013/02/11/special-report-blockbuster-death-and-growth-of-generics/, archived at http://perma.cc/
J42G-7DMA. Marginal costs may also decrease due to economies of scale, especially for simply for-
mulated small-molecule drugs. See id. Thus, if blockbusters are management-paradigm-defining, 
effort will tend to be focused away from manufacturing innovation. Although these business and or-
ganizational factors may play a significant role alongside legal factors, a full accounting of them is far 
outside the scope of this Article. 
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known, making manufacturing innovations appropriate targets for intellectual 
property incentives.123 The intellectual property exclusivity incentives available 
for manufacturing innovation, however, are less effective and have more serious 
negative effects on innovation than those available for drug discovery and de-
velopment.124 
Also like drug discovery and development, drug manufacturing is tightly 
regulated to ensure public safety.125 Regulatory structures for drug discovery and 
development create incentives for innovation and interact cooperatively with 
intellectual property to strengthen those incentives.126 Conversely, regulatory 
oversight for drug manufacturing actively inhibits innovation.127 
Section A of this Part describes how the FDA’s regulations inhibit manufac-
turing innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.128 Section B discusses potential 
innovation incentives from patents, FDA-administered market exclusivity, and 
trade secrets.129 
A. Regulatory Hurdles to Innovation in Pharmaceutical Manufacturing 
Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry occurs against a backdrop of 
pervasive regulation. In the context of drug discovery and development, the reg-
ulatory system provides significant incentives for innovation. Most directly, the 
FDA is statutorily authorized to provide market exclusivity as a reward to drug 
companies for certain behaviors.130 The FDA’s regulatory oversight also pro-
vides an indirect incentive to discover and develop new drugs. Firms develop 
drugs in several stages. Typically, the firm takes the new drug through three 
phases of clinical trials as an Investigational New Drug (“IND”) and then files 
an extensive and expensive New Drug Application (“NDA”) to win approval to 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See infra notes 248–269 and accompanying text (discussing the safe harbor under the Hatch-
Waxman Act for using patented processes); infra notes 284–331 and accompanying text (analyzing 
the benefits and shortcomings of trade secrets for pharmaceutical manufacturing). The same may be 
true for manufacturing in most industries. Other industries, however, generally do not need as large of 
incentives to overcome the major regulatory hurdles faced by drug manufacturers. See infra notes 
130–204 and accompanying text. 
 124 See infra notes 205–331 and accompanying text (discussing intellectual property in the phar-
maceutical industry). 
 125 See infra notes 130–204 and accompanying text (discussing FDA regulations on pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturing). 
 126 See infra notes 130–136 and accompanying text (explaining that FDA regulations induce drug 
discovery by creating barriers to entry that prevent competitors from entering the market); infra notes 
205–212 and accompanying text (discussing the roles of patents and FDA regulatory exclusivity in 
promoting drug discovery). 
 127 See infra notes 130–204 and accompanying text (explaining the hurdles to innovation that 
FDA regulations create for pharmaceutical manufacturing). 
 128 See infra notes 130–204 and accompanying text. 
 129 See infra notes 205–331 and accompanying text. 
 130 See infra notes 270–283 and accompanying text (describing FDA market exclusivity). 
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sell the drug.131 This costly regulatory gantlet creates a barrier to entry that can 
keep competitor drugs off the market.132 By excluding competitors, this regula-
tory system effectively extends monopoly pricing for the innovator company and 
increases the reward for the initial innovation.133 This effect operates on both 
pioneer134 and generic companies.135 Finally, as discussed below, the FDA ap-
                                                                                                                           
 131 An IND is a filing that must be made with the FDA to allow a new drug to be transported across 
states before the drug has received marketing approval and before commencing clinical trials (Phase I–III 
testing). Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approvalapplications/investig
ationalnewdrugindapplication/default.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/E8R6-HFZZ (last visited Feb. 25, 
2014). The drug is classified as an IND during Phase I-III trials. See New Drug Application, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedand
approved/approvalapplications/newdrugapplicationnda/default.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/R8MT-
H7LF (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). Phase I is the initial stage of clinical trials for an IND and focuses on 
safety. The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Enduring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/U2KT-9Y8U (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). Phase II trials focus on ensuring the drug is effective. 
Id. Finally, Phase III testing focuses on safety and effectiveness across varying populations. Id. If the 
drug passes Phase I–III trials, the manufacturer then files an NDA. See New Drug Application, supra. If 
the FDA approves the NDA, then the new drug is ready for market. See id. For a broader overview of the 
drug development and approval process, see generally MARK P MATHIEU, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: A 
REGULATORY OVERVIEW (2008). Biologics require a Biologic License Application (“BLA”) instead of 
an NDA. Biologics License Applications (BLA) Process (CBER), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Development
ApprovalProcess/BiologicsLicenseApplicationsBLAProcess/, archived at http://perma.cc/BEF4-BM2K 
(last updated Feb. 13, 2010). 
 132 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional Balance of Patents and Drug Regulation, 
20 HEALTH AFF. 119, 121 (2001). 
 133 See id. 
 134 Pioneer companies can compete in the market for a drug class despite patent protection or 
regulatory exclusivity preventing them from making an identical drug. For example, Lipitor, the all-
time top-selling drug, is a statin, a class of drugs used to reduce cholesterol. Panos Kanavos et al., 
Product Differentiation, Competition and Regulation of New Drugs: The Case of Statins in Four Eu-
ropean Countries, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 455, 457, 459 (2007). Four other branded 
statins with similar methods of action have also been widely marketed: Zocor, Leschol, Baychol, and 
Pravachol. Id. at 457. Each additional new drug faced the same expensive regulatory hurdles to obtain 
marketing approval, but entered a market with entrenched competition. In a study of statin market 
share in four European countries, the first statin on the market maintained higher market share and 
higher prices for a period after the entry of branded substitute statins, but all statins gradually con-
verged to similar market shares, with some price differentiation remaining. Id. at 457, 459–61, 464. 
Thus, because later market entrants face lower revenues, but the same high regulatory approval costs, 
marginal market entrants (a hypothetical sixth branded statin) are deterred from entering. For very 
large markets like statins, the hundreds of millions of dollars for regulatory approval may be balanced 
by potential profits; for smaller markets, the same regulatory costs are correspondingly more im-
portant, deter more competition, and thus preserve monopoly or oligopoly pricing power. 
 135 Although the costs of generic approval are much lower, so are potential profits, which keeps 
the regulatory barrier to entry significant. Eisenberg, supra note 132, at 121. In some circumstances, 
however, the first generic entrant can obtain a 180-day window of exclusivity because the generic 
company usually sells its drugs at near-monopoly prices within that window and, as a result, increases 
profits tremendously. Id. at 122. No other generic companies have the benefit of this extra profit. See 
id. 
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proval process strengthens the exclusivity effects of drug patents by making the 
patents much harder to invent around.136 
In the context of drug manufacturing, however, the FDA not only fails to 
create incentives for innovation, it imposes significant limits on innovation.137 
First, institutional resistance to approving novel technologies restrains innova-
tion during the NDA process. As a result, firms avoid innovative technologies in 
NDAs for fear of delays in receiving marketing approval. Subsection 1 discusses 
these preapproval regulatory barriers.138 Second, some aspects of manufacturing 
are mandated by current Good Manufacturing Practices (“cGMP”) regulations, 
which create de facto technological standards that are not subject to firm-level 
innovation. Subsection 2 discusses these de facto standards and their effect on 
innovation.139 Third, postapproval changes in manufacturing are hampered by 
procedural hurdles of regulatory filings, known as supplemental NDAs 
(“sNDAs”), and by substantive hurdles of regulatory lock-in of manufacturing 
methods determined early in development. Subsection 3 analyzes these postap-
proval barriers.140 All of these regulatory constraints are generally imposed 
without considering their impact on manufacturing innovation and efficiency.141 
1. Preapproval Barriers 
The first and perhaps most pervasive barrier to innovation arises before ap-
proval and reflects a combination of typical agency practice and market dynam-
ics, which together heavily dissuade firms from including novel technologies in 
NDAs. An NDA—or an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) for a 
generic—must include “a full description of the methods used in, and the facili-
ties and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and packing of such 
drug,”142 which must be approved by the FDA.143 The agency has historically 
been reluctant to accept unfamiliar technologies, especially in NDAs.144 
                                                                                                                           
 136 See infra notes 223–269 and accompanying text (discussing patents’ role in the pharmaceutical 
industry). 
 137 This Article does not claim that FDA’s innovation-dampening effect is deliberate. The reasons 
behind specific manufacturing regulations may be the subject of future work. Notably, regulations that 
block innovation run contrary to the common story of administrative agency capture by the regulated 
industry. For a brief description and helpful notes on agency capture theory, see DANIEL CARPENTER, 
REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE 
FDA 36–43 (2010). 
 138 See infra notes 142–154 and accompanying text. 
 139 See infra notes 155–167 and accompanying text. 
 140 See infra notes 168–204 and accompanying text. 
 141 OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 126 (“[In] life sciences operations[,] . . . the 
tendency is for compliance requirements to be imposed upon operations without adequate considera-
tion for the effectiveness of the method or the implications on the overall process flow.”). 
 142 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(D) (2012); see 21 C.F.R § 314.50(d)(1) (2013) (specifying the manufac-
turing and chemical disclosures that must be made on an FDA application). For ANDAs, see 21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A), which outlines the specific information that must be contained in a ANDA 
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For example, for roughly a decade beginning in the 1960s, several compa-
nies filed NDAs that included manufacturing controls that used a technique 
known as high performance liquid chromatography (“HPLC”).145 At the time, 
HPLC was considered technically superior to the previously dominant technolo-
gy of thin-layer chromatography.146 The FDA, however, was familiar with the 
older technology and had approved its use. Thin-layer chromatography was also 
used in the United States Pharmacopoeia (“USP”), a source of drug standards.147 
Conversely, FDA reviewers were relatively unfamiliar with HPLC. As a result, 
getting approval for an NDA that used HPLC was nearly impossible for that 
decade; firms had to replace HPLC with an alternate technique to receive ap-
proval.148 Eventually, the FDA was persuaded to accept HPLC as a validated 
technique, and it is now widely used.149 
HPLC provides an early example of the difficulty pharmaceutical firms 
face in trying to get new technology approved after the FDA started tightly regu-
lating pharmaceutical manufacturing processes. HPLC also provides an unusual 
example of firms persistently trying to obtain FDA approval of a new technique, 
despite initial FDA rejections. Firms have learned from the HPLC experience—
and other similar situations—that even if a sponsor can eventually get FDA ac-
ceptance of an innovation, there is a risk of major delay in getting approval. This 
lag in approval has very high costs for sponsor companies because any delay 
cuts into the patent-protected period of market exclusivity, and brand companies 
make the vast majority of their profits during this period.150 
Consequently, companies have very strong incentives to avoid incorporat-
ing any new technologies in NDAs. A Pfizer executive testified about this effect 
to the FDA, describing an initial NDA draft that included two parallel ways to 
measure a drug’s characteristic: the older method required shipping a sample 
3500 miles, from Ireland to New Jersey, and took a week to get results, whereas 
the newer method could be done on-site in the manufacturing plant in a matter of 
                                                                                                                           
application, and 21 C.F.R § 314.94(a)(9), which describes the information that must be included in an 
ANDA manufacturing application, including a description of the utilized equipment. 
 143 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(D), (j)(2)(A). 
 144 See CARPENTER, supra note 137, at 67–68 (providing a persuasive account of the FDA’s risk-
aversion as based in concerns of personal and individual reputation). 
 145 Interview with Ajaz Hussain, supra note 1. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 See generally GEORGE LUNN, HPLC METHODS FOR RECENTLY APPROVED PHARMACEUTI-
CALS (1st ed. 2005) (detailing HPLC methods for assays of hundreds of recently approved drugs). 
 150 See CARPENTER, supra note 137, at 637. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2013) (providing 
for market exclusivity). 
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minutes.151 Due to worries about regulatory delays and associated costs, Pfizer 
removed the second, innovative method from the NDA, declining to risk delay 
in trying to get the new technique approved.152 Even though the FDA does not 
have an explicit policy of denying preapproval innovations, firms’ realistic fears 
of delay consistently keep novel technologies out of NDAs.153 Because other 
regulatory barriers make changing manufacturing procedures postapproval diffi-
cult,154 this preapproval barrier has effects that persist throughout the lifetime of 
a drug. 
2. Current Good Manufacturing Practices 
The second type of barrier comes from the requirement that drugs be manu-
factured in compliance with cGMP regulations.155 Generally, the FDA avoids 
technology mandates; in terms of innovation, this is beneficial, as innovation 
theory recognizes that innovation can be stifled when regulators require the use 
of specific technologies.156 Although cGMP regulations contain rigorous re-
quirements on all aspects of drug manufacturing—including ventilation of pro-
duction buildings, equipment maintenance and cleaning, and production and 
control records for each batch,157 these requirements are goal-oriented perfor-
mance standards.158 Nevertheless, the industry effectively creates de facto tech-
nology mandates by adhering tightly to technical examples in cGMP guidance 
                                                                                                                           
 151 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SCIENCE BOARD MEETING 
140–43 (2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/transcripts/3799t1_02.pdf, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/NC45-KEDT. 
 152 Id. 
 153 See id. 
 154 See infra notes 168–204 and accompanying text (discussing procedural and substantive barri-
ers to postapproval innovation). 
 155 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B) (2012) ( “A drug . . . shall be deemed to be adulterated 
. . . if . . . the methods used in, or the facilities or controls used for, its manufacture, processing, pack-
ing, or holding do not conform . . . with current good manufacturing practice . . . .”). 
 156 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 32, at 2 (technology mandates); 
Gaia J. Larsen, Skewed Incentives: How Offshore Drilling Policies Fail to Induce Innovation to Re-
duce Social and Environmental Costs, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 139, 165–74 (2012) (innovation theory); 
Andries Nentjes et al., Technology-Forcing Through Environmental Regulation, 23 EUR. J. POL. 
ECON. 903, 903–04 (2007) (same). 
 157 See 21 C.F.R. § 211.46 (2013) (ventilation of production buildings); id. § 211.67 (equipment 
maintenance and cleaning); id. § 211.188 (production and control records). 
 158 See, e.g., id. § 211.63 (“Equipment used in the manufacture, processing, packing, or holding of 
a drug product shall be of appropriate design, adequate size, and suitably located to facilitate opera-
tions for its intended use and for its cleaning and maintenance.”). One exception is an organizational 
mandate that the quality control group must be separate from the manufacturing group. Id. § 211.22. 
Manufacturing personnel are thus frequently less focused on regulatory quality, and quality control 
personnel understand manufacturing less well and are less likely to seek regulation-compliant innova-
tive changes. HEDLEY REES, SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT IN THE DRUG INDUSTRY: DELIVERING 
PATIENT VALUE FOR PHARMACEUTICALS AND BIOLOGICS 120–22 (2011). Quality control enforces 
regulatory requirements rather than seeking generally to improve quality. Id. 
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documents which causes even more severe consequences than the common prac-
tice of treating guidance as effectively binding.159 As a result, the industry nar-
rows the diversity of acceptable technologies. 
The most pervasive example of industry reliance on cGMP examples is 
seen in the industry’s reaction to the FDA’s 1987 Guideline on General Princi-
ples of Process Validation.160 That guidance, which described the way compa-
nies should validate processes, including manufacturing methods, stated the 
principle that “[t]ests and challenges should be repeated a sufficient number of 
times to assure reliable and meaningful results.”161 To illuminate this broad prin-
ciple, the FDA included a single example: the Association for the Advancement 
of Medical Instrumentation’s (“AAMI”) Guideline for Industrial Ethylene Oxide 
Sterilization of Medical Devices, which required three repetitions.162 From this 
example, and just a few others mentioning three validation batches, the industry 
almost uniformly accepted a procedure of using exactly three batches for valida-
tion of every process—whether or not three batches was actually “a sufficient 
number of times to assure reliable and meaningful results,”163 as the guidance’s 
principle requires. The industry’s reliance on the three-batch regimen continues 
today, although the FDA has recently sought to roll it back,164 and in 2011 re-
placed the 1987 guidance altogether.165 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm124782.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/PMH4-72H3 (last 
updated Sept. 16, 2013) (observing that the industry adopted a certain standard based solely on a sim-
ple example provided in FDA guidelines). Guidance is explicitly nonbinding and includes disclaimers 
to that effect. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 32, at 2 “FDA guidance doc-
uments, including this guidance, do not establish legally enforceable responsibilities.”). 
 160 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDE-
LINE ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PROCESS VALIDATION (1987), available at http://babel.hathitrust.
org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015029699587;view=1up;seq=1, archived at http://perma.cc/X2Q4-H3U3; Ques-
tions and Answers on Current Good Manufacturing Practices, Good Guidance Practices, Level 2 Guid-
ance—Production and Process Controls, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm124782.htm#5, archived at http://perma.cc/
S2ZS-F48K (last updated Sept. 16, 2013) (discussing the industry and FDA reaction to the FDA’s 1987 
guidelines). 
 161 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 160, at 16.  
 162 Id. at 16 n.7 (“For example, the AAMI Guideline for Industrial Ethylene Oxide Sterilization of 
Medical Devices approved 2 December 1981, states: ‘The performance qualification should include a 
minimum of 3 successful, planned qualification runs, in which all of the acceptance criteria are 
met.’”).  
 163 See id. at 16 (imposing this sufficiency requirement); Questions and Answers on Current Good 
Manufacturing Practices, Good Guidance Practices, Level 2 Guidance—Production and Process 
Controls, supra note 160 (discussing the industry and FDA reaction to the FDA’s 1987 guidelines). 
 164 See Drugs, supra note 159 (noting that the drug industry adopted a three-batch standard based 
in part on the 1987 Guidelines and specifying that the three-batch standard should not be generally 
applied). 
 165 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDE-
LINE FOR INDUSTRY: PROCESS VALIDATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (2011), available 
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The industry thus self-imposes technological standards by adhering to 
guidance examples over principles. This self-limitation is based on firms’ desires 
to avoid regulatory delay or uncertainty. The limitation also reflects the indus-
try’s preference for regulatory compliance over quality.166 Like other technologi-
cal standards, adhering to guidance examples hinders innovation. The FDA has 
recently sought to deal with this industry-imposed restriction by simply refusing 
to include examples in guidance documents.167 Other innovation-increasing 
changes may shift industry behavior from this pattern as well. 
3. Postapproval Manufacturing Changes: Procedural and Substantive Barriers 
Innovation in manufacturing can also take place after FDA approval of a 
drug and its manufacturing method. The process of continual improvement is 
central to manufacturing efficiency in other industries. Larger, discrete innova-
tions can also be incorporated to improve production. Intuitively, manufacturers 
that make a product for years should be better at the process because of their 
experience, gained and applied through process tweaks and improvements. This 
assumption, however, relies entirely on manufacturers’ ability to innovate manu-
facturing methods after FDA approval. In the petroleum processing industry, for 
instance, continuous improvement of larger, discrete processing inventions has 
been as valuable as the discrete inventions themselves.168 In contrast, the process 
of improvement in drug manufacturing faces substantial hurdles from the FDA, 
including both procedural barriers in the form of regulatory filings169 and sub-
stantive barriers in the form of regulatory lock-in based on the empirical basis of 
persistent drug specifications.170 
                                                                                                                           
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/%20.%20.%20.%20/Guidances/UCM070336.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/GP6Q-XBQH. 
 166 See JOHN AVELLANET, GET TO MARKET NOW! TURN FDA COMPLIANCE INTO A COMPETITIVE 
EDGE IN THE ERA OF PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 187 (2010) (“Quality systems do not exist for the 
sake of quality. . . . [They] exist to implement and maintain the quality system required by regulatory 
health agencies and regulations.”). 
 167 See Interview with Emil Ciurczak, Consultant, Doramaxx Consulting (May 8, 2013) (noting 
that this approach is increasingly frequent). For example, one recent FDA manufacturing equipment 
draft guide reads: “When the [scale-up and postapproval changes (“SUPAC”)] equipment addenda 
were published with tables referencing specific equipment, the tables were misinterpreted as equip-
ment required by FDA.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SUPAC: MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT ADDENDUM 6 (2013), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UC
M346049.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WBT6-XTQL. As a result, the FDA goes on to say, the 
“revised draft SUPAC addendum contains general information on SUPAC equipment and no longer 
includes tables referencing specific equipment.” Id. 
 168 John L. Enos, A Measure of the Rate of Technological Progress in the Petroleum Refining 
Industry, 6 J. INDUS. ECON. 180, 187–93 (1958). 
 169 See infra notes 171–183 and accompanying text. 
 170 See infra notes 184–204 and accompanying text. 
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a. Procedural Barriers from Regulatory Filings 
The FDA’s requirements that manufacturing changes be registered and ap-
proved impose the greatest procedural barrier for manufacturing innovation.171 
After receiving marketing approval, a sponsor must notify the FDA if it makes 
any changes to an approved application.172 Changes are categorized as major, 
moderate, or minor.173 Substantial regulatory submissions are required for major 
and moderate changes.174 Major changes require agency preapproval before im-
plementation.175 Any manufacturing change that “may affect the impurity profile 
and/or the physical, chemical, or biological properties of the drug substance” is a 
major change.176 Minor changes, on the other hand, must be detailed in an annu-
al report.177 For changes in any category, the drug sponsor must evaluate the 
change’s effects on product safety and efficacy and illustrate those effects 
through appropriate studies to determine whether a supplement is needed.178 
The procedure for getting any change approved is costly. In addition to the 
actual costs of preparing and submitting a manufacturing supplement, time is 
required to prepare the supplement and to receive a decision from the FDA. Per-
haps even more important, a supplement raises risks that the FDA might not ap-
prove the submission, which decreases the expected benefit of a change, and that 
the FDA might reopen previously approved and settled manufacturing issues and 
find new problems with the old method. 
Overall, the system creates a substantial regulatory burden for postapproval 
manufacturing innovations, with correspondingly larger burdens for larger 
changes.179 Such procedural costs, when applied to every change, may complete-
                                                                                                                           
 171 OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 71. 
 172 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)–(d) (2013). Major notifications come in the form of an sNDA. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. § 314.70(b), (c). Moderate changes include changes to the container closure system that do 
not affect drug quality, id. § 314.70(c)(2)(i); removing a test or relaxing a requirement to comply with 
an official drug compendium, id. § 314.70(c)(2)(iii); and, for biologics, changes in production scale 
that involve changing equipment or replacement of equipment with differently designed equipment 
that does not otherwise change the production process, id. § 314.70(c)(2)(ii)(A)–(B). 
 175 Id. § 314.70(b)(3). In addition to the actual regulatory procedural hurdles, the requirement of 
regulatory submissions creates intrafirm hurdles, because innovative ideas must be transferred from 
the manufacturing department to the separate regulatory compliance department. 
 176 Id. § 314.70(b)(2)(iv). Major changes have “a substantial potential to have an adverse effect on 
the identity, strength, quality, purity, or potency of the drug product as these factors may relate to the 
safety or effectiveness of the drug product.” Id. § 314.70(b). They also include changes to the formu-
lation or specification of the drug, including inactive ingredients. Id. § 314.70(b)(2)(i). 
 177 Id. § 314.70(d). 
 178 21 U.S.C. § 356a(b) (2012). 
 179 See supra notes 171–178 and accompanying text. Applications also burden the FDA, which 
has been “overwhelmed by the number of Chemistry, Manufacturing, and Controls (CMC) supple-
ments filed in recent years.” Yu, supra note 62, at 782. In 2005 and 2006, the Office of Generic Drugs 
alone received over 3000 such manufacturing change supplements. Id. Over 1600 supplements were 
filed for branded pharmaceuticals and over 800 for biologics. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
518 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:491 
ly prevent the type of continuous improvement that has been so successful in 
driving efficiency in other industries.180 Additionally, the costs associated with 
small changes likely create a mindset that all changes are to be avoided as overly 
troublesome and unprofitable. This mindset may shift efforts away even from 
larger, net-beneficial innovations.181 This reality of procedural barriers is also in 
significant tension with the underlying theoretical goal that Good Manufacturing 
Processes be “current.”182 
Overall, procedural barriers are a major limitation to manufacturing innova-
tion, particularly with respect to implementing new techniques and procedures. 
Because every manufacturing change involves a significant regulatory cost in 
terms of money, time, and uncertainty, all innovation becomes less likely.183 
From a structural perspective, a central pillar of manufacturing innovation in 
other industries is continuous improvement through frequent small changes. 
Those small changes are the least likely to justify the expense of regulatory ap-
                                                                                                                           
SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FY 2008: PERFORMANCE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE 
CONGRESS FOR THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT 22 (2008), available at http://www.fda.
gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UserFeeReports/PerformanceReports/
PDUFA/UCM209479.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AH8C-5T8R. Of the latter two sets, approxi-
mately one-third of supplements required prior approval and two-thirds did not. Id. Especially for 
changes which require FDA approval before implementation, this can result in process delays of 
months to manufacturers and major costs to the FDA. See id. at 23. Evaluating manufacturing sup-
plements makes up roughly 11% of the FDA’s application workload. Prescription Drug User Fee Rates 
for Fiscal Year 2013, 77 Fed. Reg. 45639, 45641 tbl.4 (Aug. 1, 2012). 
 180 See Yu, supra note 62, at 782 (“[T]he burdensome regulatory requirements of supplements 
imposed on manufacturers for executing minor and incremental changes to manufacturing processes 
and controls inhibits continuous improvement and strategies for the implementation of continuous 
‘real time’ assurance of quality.”). 
 181 See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 160 (noting that although regulatory barri-
ers may hinder innovation, some firms may use the barriers as an excuse for not investing in and suc-
cessfully improving on manufacturing processes). 
 182 Facts About Current Good Manufacturing Practices (cGMPs), DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/Manufacturing/ucm169105.htm, 
archived at http://perma.cc/WAX5-PJBV (last updated May 2, 2013). According to the FDA, the flex-
ibility in cGMP regulations allows companies to use modern technologies and innovative approaches 
to achieve higher quality through continual improvement. Id. Accordingly, the “c” in cGMP stands for 
“current,” requiring companies to use technologies and systems that are up-to-date in order to comply 
with the regulations. Id. Systems and equipment that may have been “top-of-the-line” to prevent con-
tamination, mix-ups, and errors “10 or 20 years ago may be less than adequate by today’s standards.” 
Id. This theoretical requirement for continuous improvement is heavily contradicted by both agency 
and industry practice as described throughout this Article. 
 183 See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 160. Procedural expenses are not unique to 
the pharmaceutical industry, but are lower even in other closely-regulated industries. In the aero-
nautics industry, for example, producers of parts for airplanes must obtain Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (“FAA”) approval prior to manufacturing airplane parts. See 14 C.F.R. § 21 (2013). The FAA 
must be notified of, and can review, any change in manufacturing procedure that could affect the air-
worthiness of a part. See, e.g., id. §§ 21.93–.97 (regarding approval of changes to type certificate); id. 
§§ 21.139, 21.150, 21.309, 21.320, 21.609, 21.620 (regarding notification and review of changes in 
manufacturing facilities or quality systems). Notification and review, however, do not require preap-
proval, thus reducing time and cost barriers. 
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proval, so the path of innovation may be entirely foreclosed for drug manufac-
turers. In addition to the procedural barriers imposed by FDA regulations, the 
regulations also create substantive barriers to manufacturing innovation. 
b. Drug-Specific Substantive Barriers via Regulatory Lock-in 
Substantive barriers to change privilege the status quo. These barriers re-
volve around a requirement for consistency with previously observed values, 
instead of compliance with knowledge-based goals. Medications are approved 
principally on the basis of clinical trials.184 The FDA’s empirical approval of a 
drug is based on clinical trials using that drug as it existed when used in the clin-
ical trials.185 For most drug characteristics, including those that do not affect 
treatment outcomes or safety, whatever values may exist at the time of regulato-
ry submission become the benchmark for measuring future drugs.186 Specifica-
tions are set without justifying why they should have those values except that 
those values worked in the relevant clinical trials. In the absence of sufficient 
understanding, the positive becomes the normative through regulatory en-
trenchment. 
The main implementation of this process is the batch-based generation of 
drug quality specifications. For some drug attributes, like moisture content or 
levels of impurities, the acceptable specification for the drug is determined by 
testing three batches187 of the drug as used for clinical testing.188 Specifications 
for the drug are set based on the average values and variability of those initial 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 25; Allison Stoddart, Note, Missing After 
Mensing: A Remedy for Generic Drug Consumers, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1967, 1968 (2012). 
 185 See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 25. 
 186 See id. As one commentator has explained: 
Too often in the past regulatory submission contained limited information concerning 
the specific root causes of those conditions. As a result, these conditions became regula-
tory commitments and plant operators were expected to always reproduce exactly those 
same sets of conditions. This type of operation can be considered a “static manufactur-
ing operation” because it creates a mind-set that “product is approved and validated—
do not change.” 
Id. 
 187 See supra notes 160–167 and accompanying text (explaining that manufacturers blindly and 
detrimentally use three batches to follow an example provided in the 1987 FDA Guideline on General 
Principles of Process Validation). 
 188 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY: DISSOLUTION TESTING OF IMMEDIATE RELEASE SOLID ORAL DOSAGE FORMS 3, 5 (1997) 
[hereinafter DISSOLUTION], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm070237.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/A2AD-NCYW; see 
also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUS-
TRY: Q3A IMPURITIES IN NEW DRUG SUBSTANCES (2008) [hereinafter Q3A IMPURITIES], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm127984.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/46SU-CTA4 (“The selection of impurities in a new drug substance specification should be 
based on the impurities found in batches manufactured by the proposed commercial process.”). 
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batches, and all future batches of the drug are required to meet those specifica-
tions.189 
For parameters where the industry and the FDA truly do not understand 
what works and why, this valuation approach may make sense, but even in areas 
where the relevant science is well understood, empiricism-based consistency still 
controls.190 Dissolution provides one central illustration. A drug’s dissolution 
profile measures how fast the active ingredient releases from the drug product 
(e.g., a tablet or capsule) and how fast the ingredient becomes soluble once re-
leased.191 Dissolution profiles help determine how fast the drug will enter the 
bloodstream.192 Based on the empirical approach, the dissolution profile generat-
ed from testing initial drug batches is used to establish batch-to-batch consisten-
cy in ongoing manufacturing, as well as to evaluate manufacturing changes in 
scale, site, component and composition, or equipment and process.193 Any 
change, and every batch, must match the specified dissolution profile to be ap-
proved. The empiricism-based consistency approach for dissolution, however, 
fails to incorporate the well-developed understanding of differences in solubility 
between different types of drugs. For highly soluble drugs, dissolving is easy and 
therefore wide variation is likely to have no effect on the drug’s effectiveness 
(i.e., some other step, like crossing the gastrointestinal wall, limits the rate of 
drug action).194 For low-solubility drugs, the dissolution rate may be crucial to 
the drug’s performance.195 Thus, tight manufacturing controls, although costly, 
make sense for low-solubility drugs to ensure that dissolution profiles are very 
similar to those of the clinically tested samples. But for highly soluble drugs, 
where there is no reasonable expectation that even significant dissolution varia-
                                                                                                                           
 189 See DISSOLUTION, supra note 188, at 2 (“Once the specifications are established in an NDA, 
the dissolution specifications for batch-to-batch quality assurance are published in the United States 
Pharmacopeia (USP) as compendia standards, which become the official specifications for all subse-
quent IR products with the same active ingredients.”). 
 190 This system and its accompanying incentives may actively discourage the production of de-
tailed drug knowledge, a question for future research. 
 191 See DISSOLUTION, supra note 188, at 1–2. 
 192 See id. Permeability through the walls of the gastrointestinal tract also significantly influences 
how quickly an oral dosage form enters the bloodstream. See id. at 4. 
 193 Id. at 5, 8. 
 194 See Yu, supra note 62, at 783. One commentator notes that “current dissolution acceptance 
limits are selected based on data from a small number of batches in the context of their ability to dis-
tinguish batches with limited regard to clinical relevance.” Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, under a 
more rational approach, highly soluble drugs could have wide acceptance limits, whereas low solubili-
ty drugs may need closer examination in dissolution testing. Id. 
 195 See id. Regulators accept wider variation among highly soluble drugs; all of these drugs quick-
ly react in the patient’s system, so variations—even wide variations—among dissolution rates are not 
likely to affect how the drug reacts. See id. Conversely, for drugs that do not dissolve quickly, the 
point of solubility in the patient is often critical for the drug to be effective, and thus, regulators do not 
accept wide variation in these solubility rates. See id. 
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bility would affect drug efficacy,196 tight manufacturing controls stand in the 
way of higher efficiency and other process innovations, without any correspond-
ing health or safety benefit. 
For this type of observationally determined parameter, FDA regulatory 
oversight locks in the result of initial manufacturing techniques despite the fact 
that most firms do not optimize the initial manufacturing batches used for clini-
cal trials for efficient high-quality, large-scale production.197 Instead, most firms 
rush to produce clinical testing batches as fast as possible to speed drugs to mar-
ket.198 Manufacturing efficiency and controllability are accordingly given much 
lower priority, and firms tend to avoid making significant investments in manu-
facturing process development at the stage when clinical trial supplies are being 
produced.199 Low rates of clinical trial success also lead to decreased invest-
ments in developing robust manufacturing understanding because firms typically 
do not know early on whether a drug is likely to proceed to market.200 Under the 
traditional model, manufacturing process development thus happens during later 
(Phase II or III) clinical trials—after most of the drug’s critical parameters have 
already been largely determined and locked in by characterization of clinical trial 
supplies.201 
Overall, regulation stunts innovation in pharmaceutical manufacturing. In 
other industries, regulation is aimed at well-understood quality goals, and manu-
facturers can innovate to reach or surpass those goals efficiently.202 In pharma-
ceutical manufacturing, however, the quality goals are defined observationally, 
on the basis of early, non-optimized manufacturing processes themselves. Thus, 
regulations encourage pharmaceutical manufacturing to maintain the status quo 
and prevent changes. Recent increased focus on quality regulations is likely to 
exacerbate the problem. The Department of Justice has stated that it plans to take 
an increased role in enforcing cGMP regulations.203 The FDA stated in parallel 
                                                                                                                           
 196 See id. 
 197 See OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 56, at 80. 
 198 Id. 
 199 See REES, supra note 158, at 405–07. Recently, some companies have experimented with 
developing manufacturing processes simultaneously with major clinical trials, but this requires signif-
icant expertise and resources generally available only to the largest pharmaceutical companies. Basu, 
supra note 64, at 80. Process development has been estimated to account for as much as 15–30% of 
R&D costs. Cox, supra note 78. 
 200 Ismail Kola & John Landis, Can the Pharmaceutical Industry Reduce Attrition Rates?, 3 NA-
TURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 711, 711 (2004). 
 201 AVELLANET, supra note 166, at 60. Under a Quality-by-Design (“QbD”) approach, discussed 
in Part III, manufacturing methods should ideally be largely in place by Phase II. Id.; see infra notes 
358–374 and accompanying text. 
 202 See Frimpong, supra note 109. 
 203 Id. Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney General, recognized 
the relevant efficiency constraints: “We know, of course, that there are enormous pressures on all parts 
of the industry to produce drugs more quickly, cheaply, and efficiently, and our message to you is that 
you cannot sacrifice drug safety in service of these pressures.” Id. 
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that it intended to make quality enforcement a major focus in 2013, even though 
the agency had already stepped-up enforcement of cGMP and quality regulations 
in the recent past.204 Increased enforcement is likely to encourage risk-averse 
adherence to old, approved processes rather than innovative change to newer, 
more robust methods. 
Regulatory hurdles alone, however, cannot fully explain manufacturing 
stagnation because firms are able to overcome the tremendous regulatory hurdles 
for getting drugs initially approved. The lack of innovation in pharmaceutical 
manufacturing must also be attributed in large part to a lack of sufficient innova-
tion incentives, whether sourced from regulatory exclusivity or from intellectual 
property-based exclusivity. 
B. Intellectual Property Incentives for Innovation 
Innovation policy in the pharmaceutical industry, which has been shaped by 
several Congressional acts, including the Hatch-Waxman Act,205 focuses on 
market exclusivity incentives for innovation in drug discovery and development. 
Foremost in innovation policy is the patent system, but the pseudo-patent system 
of FDA-administered statutory exclusivity is also used to augment and modify 
drug patents.206 These innovation incentives operate differently throughout the 
various stages of drug development. Patents, although available throughout the 
development process, are particularly prominent in protecting early invest-
ments.207 Patents also play a strong role after approval in staving off generic 
drug entry by preventing entry until the patents expire. Postapproval, patents 
also protect drug innovations through “evergreening," a set of tactics used by 
firms to extend effective patent protection on a drug.208 FDA regulatory exclu-
sivity, on the other hand, applies only later in the drug development process, 
once the drug has already been approved and has entered the market.209 
                                                                                                                           
 204 Hamburg, supra note 112. 
 205 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, & 35 U.S.C.). 
 206 See Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031.htm, archived at http://perma.
cc/74VG-2SNN (last visited Feb. 13, 2014). Although FDA-administered market- or data-exclusivity 
are not typically considered intellectual property, this Article chooses to include them in this Section 
nonetheless because they function similarly to create exclusivity incentives for innovation, even 
though they lack some aspects of true intellectual property. 
 207 See E.W Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–69 
(1977). 
 208 See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 354 & n.37; C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Ever-
greening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 
327–28 (2012). Such strategies include obtaining patents on a drug’s specific ingredients, an interme-
diate product, or on new uses for the product. Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 354. 
 209 Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 366. 
2014] Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing 523 
In contrast to their role in drug discovery, patents and FDA regulatory ex-
clusivity are not very effective at encouraging innovation in the field of pharma-
ceutical manufacturing. Because manufacturing process patents are hard to en-
force, those patents involve an increased cost of disclosure coupled with a de-
creased exclusion benefit.210 In addition, FDA regulatory exclusivity is unavaila-
ble for manufacturing innovations and thus plays no real role in incentivizing 
such innovation.211 As such, FDA regulatory exclusivity represents an opportuni-
ty for innovation policy.212 
Trade secrecy is significantly more important than patents and FDA regula-
tory exclusivity for manufacturing innovation.213 Like patent or regulatory ex-
clusivity, trade secrecy creates incentives for innovation by keeping others from 
copying the innovation and therefore allowing supracompetitive pricing.214 Nev-
ertheless, trade secrecy is not usually considered as a target for policy levers, 
likely because the government has a relatively small role in maintaining trade 
secrecy. Trade secrecy as the primary means of manufacturing innovation pro-
tection also causes other problems. In particular, the unique aspects of trade se-
crecy—including its practical limitations, an unbounded timeframe, process-
specificity, and limitations on personnel—make it structurally less capable of 
incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation.215 In fact, the type of innovation most 
needed in drug manufacturing—innovations reflecting greater understanding and 
process knowledge—are particularly poorly suited to protection as trade se-
crets.216 
This Section shows that of the three main incentives for pharmaceutical in-
novation—patents, FDA market protection, and trade secrecy—only trade secre-
                                                                                                                           
 210 See infra notes 235–247 and accompanying text (discussing how process patents’ costs often 
outweigh their benefits). 
 211 See infra notes 270–283 and accompanying text (explaining that there is no FDA market ex-
clusivity for manufacturing innovations). 
 212 See infra notes 419–425 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of creating a regu-
latory exclusivity regime for manufacturing innovation). 
 213 Cf. Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions 
and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 34 tbl.2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 7552, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552, archived at http://perma.cc/JW7A-
EL2W. According to a 1994 survey of the industry, pharmaceutical firms reported that 68% of process 
innovations could be effectively protected by secrecy, but only 36% by patents. Id. For products, the 
fractions were much closer at 54% and 50%, respectively. Id. at 33 tbl.1. This presumably refers to 
secrecy protection in the earlier stages of drug development, because drug details are public by the 
time a drug is marketed. See Anthony Arundel, The Relative Effectiveness of Patents and Secrecy for 
Appropriation, 30 RES. POL’Y 611, 613 (2001). 
 214 See infra notes 223–283 and accompanying text (discussing patent and FDA market exclusivi-
ty in the pharmaceutical market). 
 215 See infra notes 326–331 and accompanying text (noting the structural shortcomings of a trade 
secrecy regime). 
 216 See infra notes 284–331 and accompanying text (analyzing trade secrets in pharmaceutical 
manufacturing). 
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cy seems to play a major role in encouraging innovation in pharmaceutical man-
ufacturing.217 But trade secrecy is flawed as an innovation motivator, at least in 
this context, because it lacks the temporal limitations of either the patent system 
or FDA market protection.218 Trade secrecy also restricts socially useful disclo-
sure, largely preventing cumulative innovation, which is central to major ad-
vances.219 Trade secrecy is also least amenable to policy manipulation, as it has 
little to no government involvement. In sum, in the current system, there is scant 
intellectual property policy encouraging innovation in pharmaceutical manufac-
turing. 
Subsection 1 describes patent law, including the shortcomings and benefits 
of process patents for manufacturing processes and the safe harbor provision of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act.220 Subsection 2 discusses FDA regulatory exclusivity 
and its failure to incentivize manufacturing innovation.221 Finally, Subsection 3 
analyzes trade secrets and how trade secrecy encourages innovation but suffers 
severe drawbacks as well.222 
1. Patents 
Patents reward invention by allowing the inventor to recoup high up-front 
costs through a temporary monopoly and correspondingly high prices. In addi-
tion, the patent system requires public disclosure of the knowledge created by 
the inventor.223 This disclosure is “the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.”224 
Disclosure not only allows the eventual use of the innovation by the public, but 
also permits other innovators to use the disclosed information for their own in-
novations.225 The patent monopoly lasts twenty years from the time of filing.226 
During that time, the patentee has the right to exclude others from making, us-
ing, or selling the patented invention.227 The pharmaceutical industry is a clear 
                                                                                                                           
 217 See infra notes 223–331 and accompanying text. 
 218 See infra notes 326–331 and accompanying text (explaining that innovation secrecy across the 
industry hinders continual innovation). 
 219 See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Patents and Cumulative Innovation, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 229, 
229–32 (2000); Scotchmer, supra note 31, at 32–33. 
 220 See infra notes 223–269 and accompanying text. 
 221 See infra notes 270–283 and accompanying text. 
 222 See infra notes 284–331 and accompanying text. 
 223 See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001). 
 224 Id. (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)). 
 225 See Scotchmer, supra note 31, at 31. Trade secret law, to the contrary, neither requires nor 
allows disclosure of the innovation to the public. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985) (defining 
“trade secret” as information . . . that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable . . . and (ii) is the subject of 
efforts . . . to maintain its secrecy”); see infra notes 284–331 and accompanying text (explaining that a 
lack of disclosure in a trade secrecy regime prevents continual innovation). 
 226 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2013). 
 227 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
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outlier in the extent to which patents help drive and shape R&D investment and 
innovation in developing new drugs.228 Both composition of matter patents on 
drugs and method patents, the latter of which cover the treatment uses of the 
drug, are important to drug innovation. Composition patents are more valuable 
because a patent on the drug’s active ingredient allows the patentee to exclude 
others from making, selling, or using the drug for any use, even those uses not 
specifically envisioned by the patentee.229 
In striking contrast, patents do little to stimulate manufacturing innovation. 
Patents on manufacturing processes,230 which cover using the processes in the 
United States or importing products made with the processes,231 exist in the 
pharmaceutical industry but are less valuable and less common than other forms 
of pharmaceutical patents.232 Patents fail to drive manufacturing innovation for 
                                                                                                                           
 228 Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Recent Research on the Economics of Patents, 4 ANN. 
REV. ECON. 541, 548 (2012) (describing a survey that found that patents effectively increase innova-
tion primarily in the pharmaceutical industry); see also Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An 
Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 173, 175 tbl.1, 175–76 n.8 (1986) (noting that about 65% of 
pharmaceutical inventions would not have been introduced into the market absent patent protection, 
whereas no office equipment, motor vehicle, rubber, or textile innovations would have failed to be 
introduced); B.N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 
545–56 (2008) (describing the pharmaceutical industry’s unique dependence on patent protection to 
spur R&D investment). 
 229 Andrew Chadeayne, Composition of Matter Claims, CHADEAYNE, LLC, http://inventing
patents.com/composition-matter-claims/, archived at http://perma.cc/6KF5-PDFQ (last visited Feb. 
15, 2014). For example, Minoxidil, sold as Rogaine to treat male pattern baldness, was originally 
developed and sold by Pharmacia and Upjohn to treat high blood pressure. The initial patent on 
Minoxidil, U.S. Patent No. 3,461,461 (filed Nov. 1, 1965), covered both the compound itself and a 
method of using it to treat high blood pressure. A later patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,139,619 (filed Aug. 
19, 1977), covered the method of using Minoxidil to stimulate hair growth. Until the ’461 patent on 
Minoxidil itself expired, Pharmacia could prevent others from making or selling Minoxidil, and the 
FDA would not approve any generic version. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012). Once the ’461 patent 
expired, generic companies could apply to sell generic versions of Minoxidil to treat high blood pres-
sure—which could then be prescribed for any purpose, including treating baldness. See id. 
 230 Manufacturing innovation can be protected by process patents on a novel process or by prod-
uct patents on, for instance, a new piece of equipment. This Article focuses on process patents because 
they face unique enforcement problems. Equipment patents may help drive innovation in producing 
that equipment, but the substantial absence of manufacturing innovation suggests these patents are 
insufficient to drive manufacturing innovation. 
 231 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). Merely using the process abroad does not infringe the patent. See id. 
Products made abroad using a U.S.-patented process may also be subject to an exclusion order by the 
U.S. International Trade Commission. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 232 See Jeffrey I.D. Lewis & Art C. Cody, Unscrambling the Egg: Pre-Suit Infringement Investi-
gations of Process and Method Patents, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5, 23–37 (2002) (de-
scribing how process patent costs outweigh their benefits); see also Cohen et al., supra note 213, at 
33–34 tbls.1 & 2 (reporting 1994 survey results showing that pharmaceutical firms considered secrecy 
effective for 68% of process innovations). But see Mark E. Wojcik, The Perilous Process of Protecting 
Process Patents from Infringing Importations, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 207, 210 (1992) (not-
ing that “[i]nventors of new drugs created from chemical processes often seek to patent not only the 
drugs themselves, but the way in which they are produced, in order to secure ‘double’ patent protec-
tion”). 
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two reasons: they have structural cost-benefit problems,233 and, more recently, 
they may be unavailable for certain important types of manufacturing innova-
tion.234 
a. Process Patents’ High Costs and Low Benefits 
Process patents’ cost-benefit problems prevent these patents from meaning-
fully incentivizing manufacturing innovation. Process patents’ costs are too high, 
and their benefits are too low. The costs are too high because manufacturers do 
not want to give up their competitive advantage by publicly disclosing their pro-
cesses.235 Because processes are hard to observe and hard to determine from the 
final product, reverse-engineering manufacturing processes is particularly diffi-
cult. Thus, in the absence of disclosure, competitors must independently develop 
the innovation themselves. 
Process patents’ benefits are low because they are very hard to enforce.236 
First, process patents are usually easier to invent around than product patents 
because infringing a process patent requires performing every step of the pro-
cess.237 Thus, competitors have more opportunities for variation to escape patent 
coverage.238 In addition, determining infringement can be particularly challeng-
ing because “no one outside the potential infringer knows how the product was 
made.”239 Identifying the manufacturing process from examination of the final 
product is likely even more difficult for especially valuable general manufactur-
ing methods patents (e.g., methods for performing real-time analysis of produc-
tion dynamics) compared to product-specific patents (e.g., a method for produc-
ing a water-soluble version of the nutritional supplement creatine).240 
Once suit has been brought, proving infringement is facilitated by a statuto-
ry rebuttable presumption of infringement upon a showing “(1) that a substantial 
likelihood exists that the product was made by the patented process, and (2) that 
                                                                                                                           
 233 See infra notes 235–247 and accompanying text. 
 234 See infra notes 248–269 and accompanying text. 
 235 See Girish Malhotra, Are Patents a Double-edged Sword? Perspective Matters., PROFITABIL-
ITY THROUGH SIMPLICITY (Feb. 8, 2011, 7:37 AM), http://pharmachemicalscoatings.blogspot.com/
2011/02/are-patents-double-edged-sword.html, archived at http://perma.cc/U56G-UFB3. 
 236 See Lewis & Cody, supra note 232, at 23–37 (discussing the difficulties of bringing process 
patent suits, and in particular, noting that courts have imposed Rule 11 sanctions against attorneys who 
fail to take reasonable steps to determine infringement and laborious investigative steps to support 
process infringement lawsuits). 
 237 See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1305–07 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 238 Id. See generally Cohen et al., supra note 213, at 47 fig.6 (reporting that in a 1994 cross-
industry survey, the ability to invent around a patent was one of the most important reasons that firms 
chose not to patent demonstrably novel innovations). 
 239 Lewis & Cody, supra note 232, at 7. Identifying international infringement may be particularly 
challenging. Id. at 9. 
 240 Cf. Creative Compounds, LLC v. Starmark Labs., 651 F.3d 1303, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(discussing a suit involving a product-specific patent and the hurdles to uncovering such processes). 
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the plaintiff has made a reasonable effort to determine the process actually used 
in the production of the product and was unable to so determine.”241 Nonethe-
less, as with identifying infringement, demonstrating a “substantial likelihood” 
of infringement is likely harder with general than with specific techniques. 
For biological manufacturing processes, patent protection strategies may 
differ because manufacturing methods are unusually central for biologics.242 
Even more so than for small-molecule drugs, the manufacturing complexity and 
development costs for biologics can serve as a potent barrier to entry, keeping 
competitors off the market.243 Thus, the public disclosure required by a patent 
can lower that entry barrier by providing information about both the biologic-
specific manufacturing process and general manufacturing processes for biolog-
ics, making patents particularly unattractive. Despite the risks of disclosure, 
some firms pursue process patents.244 For example, AbbVie has around 200 
manufacturing patents protecting the production of Humira, a biologic with over 
$10 billion in yearly sales used to treat arthritis,245 and intends to use them to 
                                                                                                                           
 241 35 U.S.C. § 295 (2006); see Creative Compounds, 651 F.3d at 1315. “Substantial likelihood” 
is described in one Senate Judiciary Committee report as “less than that of proving successfully at trial 
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that a product in question was in fact made by the patented 
process[,] but . . . more than a slight possibility that the product was so made.” See JOE BIDEN, SEN-
ATE JUDICIARY COMM., REPORT ON THE PROCESS PATENTS AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1989, S. REP. NO. 
100-83, at 45 (1987). If both conditions found in § 295 are met, the burden shifts to the accused in-
fringer to prove noninfringement. Creative Compounds, 651 F.3d at 1314–15 (“Because the accused 
infringer is in a far better position to determine the actual manufacturing process than the patentee, 
fairness dictates that the accused, likely the only party able to obtain this information, reveal this pro-
cess or face the presumption of infringement.” (citing Lewis & Cody, supra note 232, at 22–23)). 
Although § 295 applies to both foreign and domestic manufacturing, domestic manufacturers can 
likely determine the process used. See S. REP. NO. 100-83, at 45. According to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee report: 
The rebuttable presumption would be inapplicable if the defendant has used the process 
in the United States . . . . In these circumstances, the discovery provisions of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the equitable powers of Federal courts should be sufficient 
to allow the plaintiff to ascertain what process was employed. 
Id. 
 242 A comprehensive analysis of manufacturing patent strategy differences must await future 
work. An additional important element in biologic patent strategy comes from the differences in pa-
tent-challenge procedures for small-molecule drugs and for biologics. For a detailed explanation, see 
generally Michael P. Dougherty, The New Follow-On Biologics Law: A Section by Section Analysis of 
the Patent Litigation Provisions in the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 231 (2010). 
 243 See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (discussing the complexities of biologics manu-
facturing). 
 244 This may be especially true for previously known biologics, which are for ineligible patent 
protection as compositions of matter. Manufacturing process patents provide at least some protection. 
 245 Christopher Weaver et al., Biotech Drugs Still Won’t Copy, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2013, 7:25 
PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323864304578318111144984632. 
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extend its market exclusivity period past the 2016 expiration of Humira’s prima-
ry compound patents.246 
Overall, patents on manufacturing innovation fail to reward manufacturing 
innovation adequately. This inadequacy stems from a combination of enforce-
ment difficulties and the problem of disclosing innovative manufacturing meth-
ods to competitors.247 Firms that do not pursue process patents apparently value 
the cost of the disclosure as more significant than the speculative benefits to be 
gained from enforcing process patents. 
b. The Safe Harbor of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) 
Despite the structural problems, at least some manufacturing process pa-
tents are worth pursuing. But many of these patents have recently been made 
less valuable because of a likely unintended quirk of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
which essentially renders unenforceable a class of patents covering techniques 
central to modernizing manufacturing.248 
In authorizing a generic drug approval pathway, the Act created a safe har-
bor exemption for drugs: it is not an infringing act to use a patented invention 
“solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of infor-
mation under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of 
drugs or veterinary biological products.”249 The safe harbor was enacted to allow 
generic drug companies (and now, biosimilar companies) to develop products, 
along with the required comparability and safety information, before the expira-
tion of the pioneer company’s patent.250 The safe harbor allows generic firms to 
win approval and be ready to market the drug as soon as the pioneer’s patents (or 
market exclusivity periods) expire. 
                                                                                                                           
 246 Id. 
 247 See supra notes 235–246 and accompanying text. An additional lessening of economic incen-
tives may occur from a timing mismatch. For manufacturing methods developed by an innovator firm 
later in the course of drug development or after the drug has been approved, the value of the innova-
tion is lessened because innovator’s market share of the drug drops sharply on generic entry after 
expiration of the principal drug patents. This is especially true in the absence of a well-functioning 
licensing regime, as the innovator firm will be unable to license the innovation to other manufacturing 
firms and thus cannot capture that potential value. 
 248 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006) (providing that there is no patent infringement for utilization 
of a manufacturing process done “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submis-
sion of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or 
veterinary biological products”). 
 249 Id. 
 250 See id.; Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1354–56 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854 (2013). “Biosimilars” are products that are highly similar to a biolog-
ical product that has already received FDA approval. Biosimilars, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approval
applications/therapeuticbiologicapplications/biosimilars/default.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/D8HY-
5DZ4 (last visited Feb. 13, 2014). 
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The techniques potentially implicated by the safe harbor are central to 
modern manufacturing. These techniques are especially important for biosimi-
lars because biosimilars require extensive analytical testing to demonstrate bio-
similarity.251 To the extent that patent protection for such techniques could pro-
vide innovation incentives, those incentives were recently weakened. 
In 2012, in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a preliminary in-
junction against a generic company because the generic’s use of a pioneer’s pa-
tented technology to prepare submissions to the FDA before the patent’s expira-
tion fell within the Hatch-Waxman’s safe harbor provision.252 Momenta involved 
the making of a generic version of Lovenox (enoxaparin), a hard-to-specify mix-
ture of different-length sugar chains made by Aventis and used to treat blood 
clots.253 The FDA established five analytically complex and technically challeng-
ing “standards for identity” to establish that “generic enoxaparin has the ‘same’ 
active ingredient as Lovenox.”254 Momenta255 and Amphastar both filed ANDAs 
for generic versions of enoxaparin.256 Momenta’s application was approved 
first257—an approval worth over $1 billion annually when Momenta’s was the 
only approved generic.258 
Two days after Amphastar’s ANDA was approved, Momenta sued Am-
phastar for infringing its patent, which claimed “methods for analyzing hetero-
geneous populations of sulfated polysaccharides, e.g. heparin [and enoxapa-
rin].”259 Such methods were largely described in and required by one of the 
FDA’s “standards for identity.”260 Momenta alleged that Amphastar was infring-
ing its patent by using the claimed method to show that each commercial batch 
                                                                                                                           
 251 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERA-
TIONS IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT 8–12 (2012), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM2
91128.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3ESZ-QGYY (providing guidance and outlining the specific 
and somewhat arduous process of demonstrating biosimilarity). 
 252 686 F.3d at 1349–52, 1361. 
 253 Id. at 1349–50. 
 254 Id. at 1350. 
 255 Momenta partnered with Sandoz, Inc., (collectively “Momenta”) for this joint venture. Id. at 
1351. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. 
 259 U.S. Patent No. 7,575,886 col. 4 II. 53–55 (filed Mar. 11, 2003); see Momenta Pharm., 686 
F.3d at 1351. 
 260 Momenta Pharm., 686 F.3d at 1350–52. See generally Letter from Douglas Throckmorton, Depu-
ty Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, to Peter O. Safir and Scott L. Cunningham, Aventis Phar-
maceuticals, Inc. 17–18 (July 23, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Drug
Safety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/UCM220083.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/M5HJ-XAEZ (applying the FDA’s five-part test for identity and denying most of Aventis’s 
petition that the FDA deny approval of any generic versions of Lovenox). 
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of its generic enoxaparin was bioequivalent to Lovenox.261 The district court 
preliminarily enjoined Amphastar from using the technology.262 
The Federal Circuit reversed on appeal, holding that the safe harbor covers 
using patents to generate information for submission pursuant to drug-regulating 
laws, whether that submission is for initial approval or related to ongoing manu-
facturing.263 In fact, the information need never be submitted to the FDA, as 
long as it is “reasonably related” to such a submission.264 FDA regulations re-
quire that records associated with a produced batch of drugs be retained for at 
least a year after the batch’s expiration date and be “readily available for author-
ized inspection” at any time.265 The court held that under these regulations, Am-
phastar’s use of the batch testing data in this case was “reasonably related” to a 
submission and therefore fell under the safe harbor.266 
Modern manufacturing will require increasing amounts of in-line testing, 
examination of complex product characteristics, and analytical “fingerprinting” 
techniques.267 These methods are neither simple nor cheap to develop and are 
relatively easy to copy once known, so they are paradigm cases for intellectual 
property. But the current legal regime removes both major policy sources of in-
novation incentives for developing such techniques. First, the FDA publishes 
manufacturing testing details within standards for demonstrating bioequivalence 
or biosimilarity, eliminating the possibility of keeping the process as a trade se-
cret. Second, the safe harbor—as interpreted in Momenta—essentially eliminates 
the reward of a patent-protected monopoly. A vigorous dissent from Chief Judge 
Randall Rader recognized the expansion of the safe harbor as innovation-stifling, 
describing the decision as “an undeserved victory for those who decline to invest 
in the expense and difficulty of discovery and invention.”268 
Momenta will likely have two effects on patent-based innovation incentives 
under the current regime: (1) decreased investment in manufacturing-diagnostic 
innovation; and (2) attempts to disclose the bare minimum of information to the 
FDA necessary for approval, with the goal of making it more difficult to copy 
                                                                                                                           
 261 Momenta Pharm., 686 F.3d at 1352. 
 262 Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 184, 199 (D. Mass. 2011). 
 263 Momenta Pharm., 686 F.3d at 1354, 1361. 
 264 Id. at 1357. 
 265 21 C.F.R. § 211.180(c) (2013); see Momenta Pharm., 686 F.3d at 1357. 
 266 Momenta Pharm., 686 F.3d at 1353, 1358. The court distinguished its 2011 decision Classen 
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, which held that the safe harbor does not extend to “information 
that may be routinely reported to the FDA, long after marketing approval has been obtained,” 659 
F.3d 1057, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2011), by noting that Amphastar’s test batch data “is necessary both to the 
continued approval of the ANDA and to the ability to market the generic drug.” Momenta Pharm., 686 
F.3d at 1353, 1358. The court also held that the FDA requires Amphastar to use the patented method to 
batch-test its enoxaparin for conformity with the identity standards. Id. at 1361. 
 267 See Yves Roggo et al., A Review of Near Infrared Spectroscopy and Chemometrics in Pharma-
ceutical Technologies, 44 J. PHARMACEUTICAL & BIOMEDICAL ANALYSIS 683, 687 (2007). 
 268 Momenta Pharm., 686 F.3d at 1376 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
2014] Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing 531 
the novel techniques.269 These effects hurt innovation with two consequences. 
First, innovation in real-time and complex analytical monitoring of manufactur-
ing is crucial for making modern manufacturing more streamlined and efficient 
and for obtaining the twin goals of increasing quality while reducing costs. Sec-
ond, this type of innovation is likely central for driving forward industry-wide 
improvements based both on wider adoption and on incremental improvements 
from the initial innovation. 
Overall, process patents on manufacturing techniques are poorly suited to 
drive innovation in pharmaceutical manufacturing. In addition to the patents’ 
basic structural problems of high disclosure costs and challenging enforcement, 
the safe harbor further reduces the enforceability of continuous monitoring and 
other evaluative method process patents. 
2. FDA-Mediated Market Protection 
The second major locus of innovation policy in the pharmaceutical industry 
lies with the FDA. For drug products, the FDA is statutorily authorized to grant 
periods of market protection—market or data exclusivity—parallel to the patent 
system.270 This protection can be granted as a reward for winning approval for a 
new chemical entity,271 a treatment for a rare disease,272 or a new indication.273 
Protection can also be granted for conducting pediatric studies.274 Since 2010, 
biologics have similar periods of market protection.275 In addition to pioneers, 
protection is also available for some first-approved generics276 or interchangea-
                                                                                                                           
 269 Judging Momenta on the merits and prognosticating its effects on biosimilar development are 
both outside the scope of this Article. 
 270 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E) (2012). This exclusivity can be market exclusivity, in which the 
FDA withholds approval from competitors, or data exclusivity, in which competitors cannot rely on 
the innovator’s data and must spend large sums to generate their own. Though these two types of 
exclusivity are legally and conceptually distinct, their basic effect—to provide a large and valuable 
innovation incentive—is the same. Accordingly, this Article conflates the two forms under the term 
“market protection.” 
 271 See id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (granting five years of market exclusivity for new chemical entities 
not previously approved for any indication by the FDA). 
 272 See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) (2012) (granting seven years of market exclusivity for drugs target-
ing rare diseases that affect fewer than 200,000 patients in the United States). 
 273 See id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii) (granting three years for product changes requiring new clinical 
trials, including switching to over-the-counter status or adding a new dosage form). 
 274 See id. § 355a(b) (granting six months of additional exclusivity for conducting pediatric trials, 
which need not be limited to pediatric uses). 
 275 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(7) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013) (granting four years of market exclu-
sivity and an additional eight years of data exclusivity). The twelve-year exclusivity period granted by 
§ 262 does not apply to relatively minor changes to an approved biologic. Id. Furthermore, an addi-
tional six months may be added based on the performance of pediatric studies. Id. § 262(m). 
 276 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
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ble biosimilars.277 This “pseudo-patent” market protection, when in force, may 
even be more valuable than a patent because it is government-enforced and es-
sentially unchallengeable. Conversely, patents require expensive private en-
forcement and are subject to legal challenge.278 FDA market exclusivity also has 
various other benefits for pioneer companies.279 
The FDA’s market protection regime creates incentives to not only discover 
new drugs but also to generate valuable information about drug efficacy through 
expensive and risky clinical trials.280 This information is socially valuable but 
costly for firms to generate, and firms are unable to capture much of the infor-
mation’s value.281 The FDA promotes information creation through its initial 
market approval process, where approval is indication specific, and through its 
prohibition on industry promotion of off-label uses without adequate supporting 
clinical information.282 
Despite the power of the FDA’s innovation incentives, however, the incen-
tives focus exclusively on the process of bringing individual drugs to market. 
Even those provisions that take effect after the initial market approval (for ex-
ample, exclusivity for changes requiring clinical trials or for pediatric trials) fo-
cus on preapproval-type information and activities, such as verifying the safety 
and efficacy of the drug. FDA exclusivity incentives do not exist for manufactur-
ing innovation. Rather, the only FDA-mediated manufacturing incentives appear 
to be the ability to avoid the costs of quality failures and plant shutdowns due to 
the FDA’s regulatory oversight.283 
3. Trade Secrets 
Instead of patents or FDA market protection, trade secret protection 
grounded in state law is likely the most valuable form of intellectual property or 
                                                                                                                           
 277 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6) (granting exclusivity for twelve to forty-two months, during which 
no other interchangeable product can enter the market). 
 278 Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 364–66. 
 279 Id. at 362–66. 
 280 Id. at 370. 
 281 See id. 
 282 Id. The FDA’s ability to prohibit off-label marketing has come under serious question. Cf. 
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011). In the 2011 U.S. Supreme Court case Sorrell 
v. IMS Health, Inc., the Court held that pharmaceutical marketing is “a form of expression protected 
by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.” Id. And in 2012, the Second Circuit held that the 
FDA’s prohibition on truthful speech by pharmaceutical companies about off-label use of FDA-
approved products violates the First Amendment. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166–69 (2d 
Cir. 2012). 
 283 See generally supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of recent contami-
nation events). 
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exclusivity incentive for pharmaceutical manufacturing.284 Trade secret law pro-
vides protection from misappropriation of information that is reasonably kept 
secret and derives value from its secrecy.285 Trade secrets play a bigger role in 
protecting manufacturing processes for at least three reasons. First, enforcing 
manufacturing process patents is difficult, whereas the effectiveness of trade se-
crets—as long as they can be kept secret—does not depend on monitoring other 
firms’ activities.286 Second, trade secrets, by definition, do not require disclosure 
of information to competitors, which may be broadly useful. Finally, trade se-
crets, unlike patents or statutory exclusivity, do not have a predetermined 
lifespan; they may continue indefinitely. Given these advantages, trade secrets 
have long been important to protecting manufacturing processes, and are in-
creasingly so.287 Although reported cases are relatively rare, they provide illus-
trative examples of the possible roles trade secrets can play in manufacturing 
innovation.288 
Trade secrets can protect innovation and consequently provide an incentive 
to innovate in multiple ways. At one extreme, a well-protected trade secret on an 
essential manufacturing technique can completely prevent market entry by com-
petitors and thereby allow monopoly pricing with no predetermined time limit. 
Trade secrets on manufacturing improvements can also allow competitive cost 
advantages that change market contours. These scenarios are described below in 
Subsection 3.a.289 Like manufacturing patents, however, trade secrets can be 
hard to enforce, though in different ways. For example, the same secrecy that 
keeps the innovator company’s intellectual property secret can render the misap-
propriator’s use of the secret difficult to detect. Similarly, this secrecy can make 
it hard to determine whether the second firm in fact misappropriated the trade 
secret or just discovered it independently. These difficulties are described below 
in Subsection 3.b.290 And even if trade secrets provide some functional incentive 
to innovate, they create other difficulties both for the innovation process within a 
                                                                                                                           
 284 Telephone Interview with Geoffrey Levitt, Senior Vice President & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, 
Pfizer (Nov. 29, 2012); see supra notes 223–283 and accompanying text (discussing the shortcomings 
of patent and FDA market exclusivity in promoting manufacturing innovation). 
 285 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985). 
 286 See John Avellanet, Securing Intellectual Property from the Inside Out, in BEST PRACTICES IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT: VALUATION, LICENSING, CASH FLOW, PHARMACOECO-
NOMICS, MARKET SELECTION, COMMUNICATION, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 37, 37 (Yali Fried-
man ed., 2008). 
 287 Robert Graham Gibbons & Bryan J. Vogel, The Increasing Importance of Trade Secret Protec-
tion in the Biotechnology, Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Fields, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 261, 262 (2007). 
 288 There are relatively few reported cases about pharmaceutical trade secrets. It is unclear wheth-
er this comes from a low frequency of trade secrets, trade secret misappropriations, litigation of dis-
covered misappropriations to judgment, or some combination. 
 289 See infra notes 292–309 and accompanying text. 
 290 See infra notes 310–325 and accompanying text. 
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firm and for the spread of social benefits from innovation. These structural 
weaknesses of a trade secret regime are discussed below in Subsection 3.c.291 
a. Monopoly Maintenance by Excluding Competitors 
Trade secrets may provide innovators with an indefinite monopoly, thus al-
lowing pioneers to earn extensive supracompetitive revenues. One case that il-
luminates both the indefinite duration of trade secrets and the difficulty of repli-
cating essential manufacturing techniques is the drug Premarin. In 2003, in Wy-
eth v. Natural Biologics, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota 
permanently enjoined Natural Biologics from using Wyeth’s unpatented estrogen 
removal process (the “Brandon Process”) to make generic Premarin because 
Natural Biologics misappropriated the process in violation of Minnesota’s Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act.292 Wyeth manufactures Premarin for the treatment of 
symptoms associated with menopause and sells over $1 billion in Premarin year-
ly.293 
Premarin is a product of natural conjugated estrogens made from the urine 
of pregnant mares (“PMU”) and has been marketed without any natural generic 
substitute since 1942.294 Synthetic estrogens exist, but are not FDA-approved as 
generic substitutes for naturally derived Premarin.295 No competitor has entered 
the market, however, primarily because of the difficulty in extracting the estro-
gens.296 
Wyeth extracts and purifies the estrogens at a plant in Brandon, Manitoba, 
using the Brandon Process that Wyeth claimed as a trade secret.297 Wyeth ob-
tained several early patents on methods connected with estrogen extraction re-
search.298 These patents, however, provided insufficient information to recreate 
                                                                                                                           
 291 See infra notes 326–331 and accompanying text. 
 292 Wyeth v. Natural Biologics, Inc., No. Civ. 98-2469, 2003 WL 22282371, at *18–19, *27–29 
(D. Minn. Oct. 2, 2003), aff’d, 395 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2005). See generally MINN. STAT. § 325C.01 
(2013). 
 293 Id. at *1, *2. 
 294 Id. at *1. Premarin was approved as a drug under the Food Drug, and Cosmetics Act, rather 
than as a biologic under the Public Health Services Act, which had not yet been enacted. Accordingly, 
generic versions could be approved via the ANDA process. 
 295 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA State-
ment on Generic Premarin (May 5, 1997), available at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/Post
marketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/DrugSafetyInformationforHeathcareProfes
sionals/PublicHealthAdvisories/ucm169045.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/ZJ7P-STXX. The FDA 
decided not to approve synthetic estrogens as generic Premarin because the role of the various estro-
gens found in Premarin are not fully understood. See id. Premarin was approved before requirements 
for comprehensive analysis became a prerequisite for marketing approval. See id. 
 296 See Wyeth, 2003 WL 22282371, at *1. 
 297 Id. at *2. 
 298 Id. 
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the Brandon Process, which is unpatented.299 Wyeth took several measures to 
ensure the secrecy of the Brandon Process.300 In fact, the Brandon Process was 
not written down from 1966, when the plant opened, until 1979, when regula-
tions required the drafting of formal operating procedures.301 
Several major companies attempted to duplicate Wyeth’s success by ex-
tracting estrogens from PMU.302 All failed.303 The only other company to suc-
cessfully extract estrogens, Natural Biologics, did so by acquiring the details of 
the Brandon Process from a research chemist who had consulted for Wyeth.304 
Natural Biologics had previously failed in its attempts to recreate the Brandon 
Process by using information from the expired patents as well as manifests of the 
Brandon plant’s waste chemicals.305 On learning of Natural Biologics’s plans to 
extract estrogens using Wyeth’s Brandon Process, Wyeth sued for misappropria-
tion of trade secrets. The district court found misappropriation of trade secrets 
and a resulting likelihood of hundreds of millions of dollars in decreased reve-
nues and R&D investments for Wyeth if Natural Biologics were to bring generic 
Premarin onto the market.306 The court permanently enjoined Natural Biologics 
from researching or developing any methods for extracting estrogens from urine 
or manufacturing any such estrogens.307 
Wyeth’s trade secret of the precise manufacturing technique for Premarin 
illustrates how trade secrets can thwart the intentions of patent law, create 
deadweight social loss, and hold back manufacturing innovation. The patent bar-
gain is the disclosure of useful information to the public in exchange for a lim-
ited period of monopoly pricing to recoup the costs of developing the infor-
mation.308 But here, although Wyeth was granted several patents on Premarin—
including patents specifically on techniques for extracting estrogens from 
urine—those patents did not disclose enough information for other firms to rec-
reate Premarin once the patents had expired.309 Accordingly, Wyeth was able to 
maintain its monopoly pricing for far longer than the term envisioned by the pa-
tent bargain—over seventy years—causing deadweight loss to society well past 
                                                                                                                           
 299 Id. Wyeth’s estrogen extraction patents included, among others, U.S. Patent No. 2,429,398 
(filed May 23, 1944); U.S. Patent No. 2,551,205 (filed Oct. 1, 1947); U.S. Patent No. 2,696,265 (filed 
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 304 Id. at *6–10. 
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 307 Id. at *25–28. 
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text (discussing patent disclosure requirements). 
 309 See Wyeth, 2003 WL 22282371, at *1. 
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the time needed to recoup development costs. Finally, whatever the secret manu-
facturing method is for making Premarin, that method must lack new innovation. 
The FDA defines Premarin by its process, and that definition has not changed 
and, in fact, cannot change. In addition, no other firms have been able to inno-
vate cumulatively based on the Brandon Process. No other firms can improve the 
process of extracting estrogens from PMU, which could potentially lead to better 
drugs. And no firm can apply the knowledge embodied in that process to devel-
oping other processes, whether related to hormones, other drugs, or other fields 
entirely. Thus, although a monopoly protected by trade secrecy is certainly a po-
tent incentive for some manufacturing innovation, the secrecy also impedes oth-
er innovation. 
b. Non-Monopoly Incentives and Enforcement Challenges 
Not all trade secrets completely enforce a monopoly. One case involving 
veterinary penicillin310 demonstrates the competitive cost advantage incentives 
of an innovative manufacturing technique, but also illustrates the challenges of 
enforcing trade secrets, which limits trade secrecy’s use as innovation drivers. 
In 2003, in Norbrook Laboratories Ltd. v. G.C. Hanford Manufacturing 
Co., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York held that Han-
ford misappropriated Norbrook’s manufacturing method for producing veteri-
nary penicillin and permanently enjoined Hanford from using the method.311 
Norbrook developed a method of manufacturing veterinary penicillin by con-
ducting the final manufacturing reaction in situ without having to dry the inter-
mediate product.312 The method was technically challenging but resulted in tre-
mendous cost savings. The raw materials for the conventional method, which 
required drying, cost about $56 per kilogram, but the raw materials for the novel 
method cost only $9 per kilogram.313 The new method was sufficiently different 
that the FDA deemed it a radical shift from the normal method recognized by the 
USP and required that the method be separately approved.314 Eventually, Nor-
brook persuaded both the USP and the FDA to approve its in situ method.315 Af-
                                                                                                                           
 310 Norbrook Labs. Ltd. v. G.C. Hanford Mfg. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 463 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 311 Id. at 483–90, 492–93. 
 312 Id. at 469–71. Because the final product is a suspension, the penicillin particles suspended in 
the injection volume must be small enough to avoid clumping and causing pain when injected, but 
large enough to stay suspended. Id. at 468. In the conventional method, two early reagents are mixed, 
sterilized, filtered, dried, and milled to small particles by a third party; the powder is then sold to the 
primary manufacturer for assembly into a final dosage form. Id. In the in situ method, the primary 
manufacturer mixes the early reagents itself and “wet”-mills the product, without filtering or drying, 
into the final dosage form. Id. at 468–69. Cost savings come from avoiding drying time and avoiding 
the need for a third-party supplier of the intermediate product. Id. 
 313 Id. at 469. 
 314 See id. at 471. 
 315 Id. 
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ter approval, the “significant cost advantages” from the new process allowed 
Norbrook to acquire most of its competitor Hanford’s customers and make sig-
nificant inroads into the U.S. market for veterinary penicillin.316 
The process was so market-changing that Hanford hired Dr. Quinn, the sci-
entist who had invented Norbrook’s procedure, and who had subsequently left 
Norbrook and signed a confidentiality agreement, and induced him to share 
Norbrook’s trade secret manufacturing innovation.317 Once Hanford had ac-
quired the details of Norbrook’s in situ manufacturing process, Hanford was able 
to implement the process rapidly, without any major changes, and received FDA 
approval almost immediately.318 
The details of Norbrook’s discovery of Hanford’s misappropriation illumi-
nate how trade secrecy functions, and fails, in pharmaceutical manufacturing. 
Norbrook discovered Hanford’s misappropriation essentially by happenstance, 
not by any monitoring program or FDA notification. After Dr. Quinn left Nor-
brook, Norbrook sued him in Northern Ireland for unrelated defamation.319 In 
discovery, Norbrook uncovered the contacts between Hanford and Dr. Quinn 
during a deposition of Hanford’s CEO.320 Norbrook made a Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (“FOIA”) request to the FDA, asking whether Hanford had sought 
approval to modify its penicillin manufacturing process since Hanford had hired 
Dr. Quinn.321 The FDA provided a heavily redacted document.322 Norbrook in-
vestigated further and eventually concluded that Hanford had applied for ap-
proval to change from conventional to in situ manufacturing.323 Thereafter, Nor-
brook sent a cease-and-desist letter to Hanford and then initiated its suit for mis-
appropriation of trade secrets.324 In the end, the district court found misappropri-
ation of trade secrets and preliminarily enjoined Hanford from using or publish-
ing Norbrook’s in situ process.325 
Norbrook’s trade secret thus allows it a significant and continuing market 
advantage, acting as an incentive for the earlier innovation. This case, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 316 Id. at 473. 
 317 Id. at 474–79. 
 318 Id. at 477–79. 
 319 Id. at 472. Dr. Quinn had republished a press release by Senator Chuck Schumer, which refer-
enced an FDA investigation into alleged impurities in Norbrook’s veterinary penicillin. Id. at 469, 
472. Norbrook had also separately sued Dr. Quinn twice for other breaches of his contractual confi-
dentiality obligations; neither breach was related to the in situ technology. Id. 
 320 Id. at 469, 472. 
 321 Id. at 469. See generally Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012) (requiring agen-
cies to make available certain information to the public); id. § 552(a)(3)(A) (creating a formal request-
and-response process); Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 196–200 
(2013) (discussing FOIA). 
 322 Norbrook Labs, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 469 
 323 Id. 
 324 Id. 
 325 Id. at 489–94. 
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also exemplifies the difficulties of protecting manufacturing processes. Both 
Norbrook’s discovery that Hanford was using its protected process and its cor-
rect inference of trade secret misappropriation were fortuitous. In many cases, 
such facts remain undiscovered, rendering trade secrecy’s incentive less certain. 
c. Structural Problems with Trade Secrets as Innovation Incentives 
As described above, trade secrets have some advantages for firms over pa-
tents; assuming they can be protected, they are indefinite and do not demand 
disclosure to the public and competitors. Even well-functioning trade secrets, 
however, have serious problems when viewed from the standpoint of innovation 
policy.326 First, as long as secrecy is maintained, which may be indefinitely, no 
other firms—competitors or not—can benefit from the innovation, and society 
cannot benefit from any cumulative innovation based on the secret.327 A tremen-
dous amount of innovation is cumulative, and a large portion of cumulative in-
novation is made by firms other than the first innovator.328 
Second, the secrecy measures necessary to protect trade secrets may hinder 
initial innovation even within a firm. To increase secrecy, the trade secret will 
almost certainly be kept from many individuals at the firm, including other inno-
vators.329 Even for those who have some access to the information, protection of 
trade secrets demands compartmentalization and separation of information so 
that the information needed for an entire protected process cannot easily be mis-
appropriated.330 Thus, very few people even within the firm can build on the in-
novation. 
                                                                                                                           
 326 For a more thorough treatment of problems with trade secrecy as an innovation regime, see 
Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. 
REV. 241, 264–70 (1998), which argues that trade secrets’ costs cannot be justified because innova-
tions are already adequately protected by patent, copyright, trademark, contract, and criminal law. 
Contra Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 311, 328–32 (2008) (addressing Bone’s article and arguing that trade secrets should be under-
stood as IP rights because they act like patents and copyrights by encouraging innovation through 
exclusivity and the promise of supracompetitive profits). 
 327 See Nisvan Erkal, The Decision to Patent, Cumulative Innovation, and Optimal Policy, 23 
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 535, 536–38 (2005). 
 328 See Scotchmer, supra note 31, at 29–32. 
 329 Cf. Wyeth, 2003 WL 22282371, at *3 (noting that the manufacturing process at issue in Wyeth 
was in use since 1966 but was not written down until 1979). 
 330 See AVELLANET, supra note 166, at 149. According to one set of recommendations regarding 
best practices for trade secret-related standard operating procedures (“SOPs”): 
One way to compartmentalize and separate information is to eliminate any intellectual 
property that reveals step-by-step details of a process. For a formulation, firms might 
leave out specific measurements, relying upon training and separate ingredients list that 
is tightly controlled. The key is to avoid making it so easy that someone just needs to 
take one document to obtain critical intellectual property. The more records a person 
has to search through and assemble, the greater his or her chances are of getting caught. 
Biotechnology firms will want to be especially careful with trade secret processes. It is 
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Third, trade secrecy’s limits may restrict its incentives to only some types 
of innovation. Concerns about departing employees taking trade secrets may 
disfavor broadly applicable innovations in favor of very product-specific innova-
tions because fewer competitors could use the specific information and it would 
be worth less to them. Furthermore, some innovations are inherently hard to re-
ward through trade secrecy. For instance, because trade secrets are harder to li-
cense, a trade secret regime provides lower incentives for innovations that re-
quire widespread use by multiple actors (e.g., network effects) to create value for 
the innovator. These types of broad innovations—like sampling techniques, 
quality analysis, or process workflow—are key to large-scale improvements in 
pharmaceutical manufacturing. Unfortunately, they also fit poorly with an intel-
lectual property regime dominated by trade secrets. 
Despite trade secrets’ limits, they are undoubtedly a key tool in protecting 
pharmaceutical manufacturing techniques. They can completely bar a competitor 
from the market or give a market participant a significant cost advantage. Trade 
secrets, however, are difficult and uncertain to enforce and carry significant costs 
for their possessor in terms of maintaining secrecy and preventing disclosure of 
the secret. More significantly from a social perspective, trade secrecy prevents 
the information flow essential for cumulative innovation and may function poor-
ly for particular types of broad innovation. 
Overall, trade secrecy has problems as a primary innovation incentive, and 
patents and regulatory market protection are either ineffective or unavailable. 
This absence of incentives means that companies regularly fail to surmount the 
regulatory hurdles to innovation. The innovation deficiency of pharmaceutical 
manufacturing, with its major attendant problems, is the unfortunate result.331 
                                                                                                                           
absolutely essential to split such processes over multiple SOPs, leaving out critical pa-
rameters whenever possible, referring a reader to other, more tightly controlled docu-
ments. 
Id. 
 331 Although this Article describes mostly brand-name drug companies, generic companies face 
the same central problem of juxtaposed low intellectual property incentives and high regulatory barri-
ers to change. Setting aside the 180-day period of exclusivity sometimes available for the first generic 
to enter the market, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUID-
ANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY GENERIC DRUG EXCLUSIVITY UNDER THE HATCH-WAXMAN 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 1 (1998), available at http://www.
fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm079342.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/NWT2-5HD6, generics also face timing pressures when entering the mar-
ket. Because the price and market share of an individual generic drops rapidly as more generics enter 
the market, entering the market quickly is quite valuable. Thus, generics face similar incentives to 
make ANDA approval as quick as possible. Other regulatory barriers, including procedural hurdles, 
substantive lock-in, and de facto standards, all also apply to generics. And although the relatively low 
margins of generic manufacturing may increase the relative salience of manufacturing cost-savings, 
generics still face the absence of any supramarket incentives for innovation. 
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III. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR MANUFACTURING INNOVATION POLICY 
The lack of innovation in pharmaceutical manufacturing is a complex and 
multifaceted problem. Higher levels of innovation, both within individual firms 
and across firms through the mechanism of cumulative innovation, would bene-
fit the industry and the health care system as a whole. The drug industry inno-
vates in drug discovery and development, but other industries innovate in manu-
facturing. These comparators suggest that drug manufacturing could be a suc-
cessful target of innovation policy.332 
The complexity of the problem, arising from interacting intellectual proper-
ty and regulatory structures, forestalls a single simple solution. The unique role 
that regulatory oversight plays in creating hurdles to manufacturing innovation, 
and the contrary role oversight plays in facilitating innovation in the context of 
drug discovery and development, suggests that regulatory changes may provide 
the best policy levers to improve a moribund manufacturing innovation policy.333 
Some potential changes focus solely on regulatory hurdles. Others, however, 
suggest ways that regulation could mediate and change innovation incentives. 
Regulation could shape these incentives to drive manufacturing innovation more 
effectively by encouraging firms to surmount what regulatory hurdles are neces-
sary.334 This type of cooperative approach works well in drug discovery and de-
velopment and also offers possibilities for innovative manufacturing. One final 
                                                                                                                           
 332 These proposed policy changes, although addressing only the domestic market, also have 
international implications. Drug manufacturing takes place in a global marketplace, but an exhaustive 
comparative account of global pharmaceutical manufacturing oversight is far beyond the scope of this 
Article. North America, however, comprised 41.8% of the global pharmaceutical market in 2011. 
EUROPEAN FED’N OF PHARM. INDUS. & ASS’NS, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN FIGURES: KEY 
DATA2012, at 4 (2012), available at http://www.efpia.eu/uploads/Modules/Documents/efpia_
figures_2012_final-20120622-003-en-v1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D5T3-E2YX. And the FDA 
regulates drug manufacturers in 190 countries producing drugs for the U.S. market. See FDA’s Inter-
national Posts: Improving the Safety of Imported Food and Medical Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://test.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm185769.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/C8X6-6934 (last updated Mar. 31, 2010). Furthermore, other regulatory regimes are broadly 
similar and similarly inhibit manufacturing innovation. Telephone Interview with Prabir Basu, Presi-
dent, Pharma Mfg. (May 6, 2013); Telephone Interview with Hedley Rees, Managing Consultant, 
PharmaFlow, Ltd. (Mar. 8, 2013). Domestic solutions have the potential for international implications 
if innovation is developed here and then spreads; that innovation can be regulatory (i.e., the new struc-
tures being proposed here), or manufacturing (i.e., the intended results of those new structures). This 
is particularly true because many markets outside the EU and Japan accept approval of manufacturing 
changes by the FDA without the need for independent review. 
 333 In addition, regulatory changes provide better opportunities for carefully targeting innovation 
policy, rather than broad shifts in intellectual property, which are likely to have cross-industry implica-
tions. 
 334 The distinction between these types of changes is not perfectly clear-cut. For instance, pro-
posals to shift procedural hurdles earlier to force earlier manufacturing understanding may push the 
development of patentable ideas earlier as well. This shift would help fix the timing mismatch be-
tween drug substance patents and related manufacturing patents, where the latter may be developed 
too late to capture their full value. 
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possibility considers using market quality signals to create incentives for firms. 
This Article does not evaluate other monetary innovation incentives, such as tax-
es, prizes, and grants.335 
Section A of this Part addresses possible changes to the regulatory structure 
to encourage innovation.336 Section B of this Part then discusses how regulations 
themselves may be used to incentivize manufacturing innovation.337 Finally, 
Section C discusses the market’s lack of quality indicators and quality competi-
tion and suggests methods for coping with these market shortcomings.338 
A. Changes to Regulatory Structures 
Reforming the oversight structure is one mechanism for improving innova-
tion because regulatory oversight imposes both procedural and substantive hur-
dles to manufacturing innovation. Five different types of regulatory reform could 
help. First, federal regulatory oversight could be removed entirely, letting states 
or market and tort systems regulate pharmaceutical manufacturing.339 Second, 
the FDA could improve innovation by reducing its substantive barriers.340 One 
such effort that is slowly progressing is the FDA’s Quality by Design (“QbD”) 
initiative.341 Third, the FDA could provide increased regulatory flexibility, thus 
loosening procedural barriers to innovative change.342 Fourth, the FDA could 
change industry development incentives by requiring deeper manufacturing un-
derstanding earlier in the development process.343 Fifth and finally, the FDA 
could provide an independent validation pathway for new technologies, separate 
from the NDA process.344 
1. Removing or Privatizing Oversight 
The most radical proposal for addressing regulatory limitations on innova-
tion—but one always available in theory—is to remove regulation entirely. Pro-
                                                                                                                           
 335 A rich literature describes these other innovation incentives. For an excellent overview of the 
literature and a taxonomy of innovation incentives, see generally Daniel Jacob Hemel & Lisa Larri-
more Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013). Once the central prob-
lem of mismatched incentives and regulatory barriers is noted, the choice of solutions—and of par-
ticular forms of incentives—can be varied according to the desired effects. Some potential prize solu-
tions might involve tailoring the reward to a fraction of industry-wide cost savings, which would en-
courage firms to share and teach their innovations; such a scheme would be administratively challeng-
ing to implement, however. 
 336 See infra notes 339–403 and accompanying text. 
 337 See infra notes 404–425 and accompanying text. 
 338 See infra notes 426–444 and accompanying text. 
 339 See infra notes 345–357 and accompanying text. 
 340 See infra notes 358–374 and accompanying text. 
 341 See infra notes 375–384 and accompanying text. 
 342 See infra notes 375–388 and accompanying text. 
 343 See infra notes 389–397 and accompanying text. 
 344 See infra notes 398–403 and accompanying text. 
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ponents of this approach suggest that the FDA be removed from the role of regu-
lating drug development, manufacturing, and marketing.345 FDA removal could 
result in the absence of any oversight at all. Before the FDA existed, however, 
the industry suffered enormous quality problems, so a complete removal of all 
regulation would be unlikely.346 Instead, oversight would likely fall to the states 
or to the market and tort systems.347 
Removing the FDA’s regulatory power and federal preemption of drug reg-
ulation would allow states to regulate drug manufacturing.348 State oversight, 
however, would likely face fierce opposition from drug manufacturers, who al-
ready must navigate the challenge of complying with different national drug 
regulation regimes in multiple countries.349 If state regulations were to replace 
the FDA and federal oversight, then the problems of complying with dozens of 
additional regulatory regimes would weigh heavily against any possible benefit 
to innovation. 
Alternately, regulation of manufacturing safety could be left to the market. 
Private certification bodies, instead of the FDA, could certify that marketed 
drugs are safe and effective, as is done today for certain consumer goods.350 
Compliance with private certification could either be left entirely to market 
mechanisms to establish or could be federally mandated.351 Drug manufacturers 
would submit to an inspection regime run by private certification bodies, which 
                                                                                                                           
 345 See N.D. CAMPBELL, NAT’L CTR. FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS, MAKING DRUGS SAFE AND AVAILA-
BLE WITHOUT THE FDA 1–5 (1997) (arguing for removing FDA oversight primarily to eliminate de-
lays in approving new drugs). 
 346 See Barbara K. Immel, A Brief History of the GMPs for Pharmaceuticals, 25 PHARMACEUTI-
CAL TECH. 44, 44–46 (2001). At least part of the problem with relying solely on tort law to govern 
pharmaceutical manufacturing arises from the difficulty of observing errors, connecting manufactur-
ing errors to injury, and spotting defects that society may wish to prevent but which may not cause 
cognizable injury—such as overly large fluctuations in the amount of active ingredients. See generally 
infra notes 425–444 and accompanying text (discussing consumers’ difficulties of assessing drug 
quality). 
 347 See CAMPBELL, supra note 345, at 9–16 (discussing the benefits of private third-party regula-
tion). 
 348 Federal preemption of state drug laws (including tort liability) is a tangled field, with different 
preemption standards for generics and reference products, drugs, and devices. In addition, different 
preemption standards apply to enacted state regulation as opposed to requirements imposed by state 
tort lawsuits. For a summary of this area, see generally Leonard A. Dwarica & Nicholas R. Herrel, 
Federal Preemption of Drugs and Devices—Consequences for Injured Patients?, 25 HEALTH LAW. 4 
(2012); Amalea Smirniotopoulos, Bad Medicine: Prescription Drugs, Preemption, and the Potential 
for a No-Fault Fix, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 793 (2011). 
 349 Telephone Interview with Geoffrey Levitt, Senior Vice President & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, 
Pfizer (Dec. 20, 2012). 
 350 See CAMPBELL, supra note 345, at 1, 10. 
 351 See id. at 9–14 (discussing an example of successful private third-party drug regulation and 
the possibilities of expanding this model). 
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would accordingly certify that products were manufactured according to that 
body’s standards.352 
Several concerns arise from such a market certification approach. First, the 
protection of consumers from dangerous drugs might be considered too im-
portant to entrust to private enforcement. Second, the existence of multiple certi-
fication bodies could lead to consumer confusion and the potential for a race to 
the bottom, where different bodies compete in the market to have essentially 
laxer standards. Because indicators of drug quality are hard for consumers and 
doctors to evaluate,353 determining which certification body actually rigorously 
enforced manufacturing standards and which provided only the patina of re-
spectability might be particularly difficult.354 In addition, certification bodies 
themselves might steer clear of the market based on liability concerns.355 Fur-
thermore, manufacturing products for sale abroad could encounter major hurdles 
if only private bodies certified manufacturers.356 
More fundamentally, shifting to private certification might not actually im-
prove innovation in manufacturing very much. Key potential reasons for FDA 
barriers to innovation would apply similarly to private certification bodies. Pri-
vate certification bodies would likely have equal or less expertise than the FDA 
and could easily be equally or more risk averse than the FDA.357 In addition, 
                                                                                                                           
 352 See id. This type of mixed private-public regime is employed in other healthcare spheres, 
including in hospital certification and Institutional Review Boards (“IRBs”). See Timothy Jost, Health 
Law and Administrative Law: A Marriage Most Convenient, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 9–11 (2004). 
 353 See infra notes 426–444 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties of assessing drug 
quality). 
 354 IRBs provide a useful comparison. These federally mandated ethics bodies preapprove re-
search projects with the goal of protecting research subjects. Academic journal editors could potential-
ly evaluate research on ethical compliance, measured by approval by a well-reputed IRB. This would 
create incentives for strong IRBs. But IRB approval is instead treated as binary—IRB approved or 
not—and consequently, IRBs have proliferated, with a resulting rise in for-profit IRBs, ethical prob-
lems, and concerns of IRB-shopping. A similar dynamic could easily arise for drug manufacturing 
quality indicators. For one critique among many of IRBs in the drug research context, see Carl Elliott, 
Useless Studies, Real Harm, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2011, at A27. 
 355 See CAMPBELL, supra note 345, at 15–16. 
 356 The European Union, for instance, requires that manufacturing controls be certified by a gov-
ernment agency to meet EU standards for any imported medical products. See Directive 2011/62/EU, 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 Amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the 
Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products For Human Use, as Regards the Prevention of the 
Entry into the Legal Supply Chain of Falsified Medicinal Products, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 74, 78–79, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-1/dir_2011_62/dir_2011_62_en.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/5UH8-DDXS. 
 357 Risky actions by the FDA generate backlash, but front-line agents are relatively politically 
insulated. With a private certification body, the firm and its agents could be subject to private tort 
liability, leading to increased risk aversion. In contrast, the FDA and its agents are shielded from lia-
bility for discretionary decisions by the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (“FTCA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2012). See generally Donald N. Zillman, Protecting Discretion: 
Judicial Interpretation of the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 47 
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private bodies are just as likely as the FDA to rely on drug characteristics estab-
lished in clinical trials, as opposed to fundamental science-based specifications. 
Private oversight, therefore, would likely suffer the same substantive barriers to 
manufacturing innovation as the current system. 
Practically speaking, removing the FDA’s regulatory authority to oversee 
manufacturing is unlikely. From an industry point of view, any benefit to market 
forces potentially promoting more efficient oversight might be outweighed by 
the problem of competing state or private standards. Private bodies could easily 
face similar incentives for excessive caution as the FDA. In addition, given di-
minished consumer perceptions of the pharmaceutical industry, both consumers 
and the industry may prefer quality oversight by a relatively respected federal 
government regulator than a private or local body. 
2. Mandated Innovation 
A second approach involves correcting substantive regulatory hurdles to in-
novation. The FDA has already taken steps toward this goal in its QbD initia-
tive.358 QbD is a combination of mandated innovation, via FDA requirements of 
greater understanding and control, and a consequent reduction of substantive 
barriers arising from the current lack of such understanding. 
QbD springs from the concept that “quality cannot be tested into products; 
it should be built-in or should be by design.”359 More pragmatically, drugs are 
typically manufactured according to a stable, monitored process designed to 
keep parameters highly consistent over time; quality control happens through 
end-stage testing to identify out-of-specification products. In QbD, production is 
designed based on scientific understandings and drugs are made in a closely 
monitored dynamic process, where each stage of the process can be adjusted 
based on real-time measurements and analyses such that the end result already 
has a predefined quality level.360 The aim of QbD is that by the time the drugs 
roll off the production lines, the manufacturer already knows the exact quality of 
the final products.361 End-stage testing is used only to verify quality, not to en-
sure that the products are high-quality in the first place.362 
                                                                                                                           
ME. L. REV. 365 (1995) (discussing the FTCA and the many cases involving the discretionary function 
exemption). 
 358 Anurag S. Rathore & Helen Winkle, Quality by Design for Biopharmaceuticals, 27 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 26, 27 (2009). Although QbD-like initiatives exist in other jurisdictions, this Sub-
section focuses on the regulations and guidance issued by the FDA and the domestic implementation 
of QbD. 
 359 Id. at 27. 
 360 Yu, supra note 62, at 784. 
 361 Id. 
 362 Id. 
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QbD helps ameliorate substantive obstacles to innovation.363 If manufac-
turers have significant knowledge early in the development process—as QbD 
effectively requires—those drug characteristics that do become regulatorily cal-
cified have a much better chance of being already optimized for long-term man-
ufacturing. More fundamentally, to the extent that deep knowledge of drug prod-
ucts is developed and shared with the FDA, substantive calcification may be-
come less necessary. QbD itself is a significant source of manufacturing innova-
tion because it has potential business benefits even without improvements in 
regulatory oversight.364 
The industry is slowly adopting at least parts of QbD, though with major 
variations across sectors.365 Assessments of QbD adoption differ even within the 
FDA.366 The FDA has not promulgated regulations enforcing or requiring QbD, 
but has stated informally that full QbD implementation is expected in the near 
future.367 After this informal statement, the fraction of ANDAs including multi-
ple QbD elements increased from 24.6% in June 2012 to 82.9% in the first half 
                                                                                                                           
 363 See generally supra notes 184–204 and accompanying text (discussing substantive FDA barri-
ers to innovation, including regulatory lock-in—which results from manufacturers having to submit 
their processes for FDA approval before they are able to develop the most efficient methods of pro-
duction). 
 364 QbD can potentially increase time and efficiency. In one case study, time from dispensing 
ingredients to market availability decreased from 12 to 4 days, and quality control time was reduced 
from 8 days to 8 hours, leading to “a major cost-saving” and “additional assurance that [a] product 
will pass specification, giving a more predictable supply chain.” Chris Potter, PQLI Application of 
Science- and Risk-based Approaches (ICH Q8, Q9, and Q10) to Existing Products, 4 J. PHARMACEU-
TICAL INNOVATION 4, 21 (2009). Potential cost savings between $20 and $30 billion have been esti-
mated. See Cox, supra note 78. Roger Nosal at Pfizer has estimated that QbD saved Pfizer in excess 
of $800 million over six or seven years and suggested that similar amounts could apply to other simi-
lar companies. Cox, supra note 122; see Cox, supra note 78. 
 365 See Joanne Eglovitch, Generic Industry Has Made Progress Implementing QbD, GOLD SHEET 
(Feb. 28, 2013, 12:00 AM), available at http://www.elsevierbi.com/publications/the-gold-sheet/47/2/
generic-industry-has-made-progress-implementing-qbd. 
 366 For example, on December 4, 2012, Janet Woodcock, Director of the Center for Drug Evalua-
tion and Research (“CDER”)—a division of the FDA—stated, “I don’t know how widely QbD will be 
adopted, because there is a significant upfront investment,” and that “I think it’s fair to say, we’re not 
there yet.” Cox, supra note 122. Just three weeks before, Christine Moore, Acting Director of the 
Office of New Drug Quality Assessment in CDER’s Office of Pharmaceutical Science, stated that 
“quality by design has really caught on in industry,” that “the science and risk-based approaches in 
QbD [are] being embraced by pretty much all of the innovator pharmaceutical companies,” and finally 
that “we’re likely past the tipping point in QbD.” Id. 
 367 Nick Taylor, FDA Developing QbD Examples to Ready Generic Industry for 2013 Deadline, 
IN-PHARMATECHNOLOGIST.COM (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.in-pharmatechnologist.com/Processing/
FDA-developing-QbD-examples-to-ready-generic-industry-for-2013-deadline, archived at http://
perma.cc/QK4X-Q9X9 (quoting Lawrence Yu, Deputy Director for Science and Chemistry in the 
Office of Generic Drugs, as stating that the Office “expects . . . full implementation of QbD in January 
2013”). 
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of January 2013.368 These ANDA submissions, however, appear to prioritize 
QbD form over substance:369 submissions commonly included a massive amount 
of information without justification or conclusions, used QbD terminology im-
properly, or presented prior knowledge without necessary context or justifica-
tion.370 Thus, the industry still has far to go in actually incorporating QbD meth-
odologies to increase manufacturing efficiency and regulatory efficacy.371 
QbD techniques are subject to the same forms of market protection as other 
manufacturing techniques. Firms have shown interest in patenting QbD tech-
niques, though the safe harbor of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) raises enforceability 
questions for those patents.372 Like other manufacturing techniques, though, 
QbD techniques are largely protected as trade secrets rather than being patented 
and thereby publicized.373 
In sum, although QbD involves a regulatory mandate to address at least 
some of the innovation concerns raised above, it is far from a complete solution. 
Industry adoption of QbD has been slow and highly heterogeneous, and there is 
evidence that many companies are adopting QbD in name far more than in prac-
tice. To the extent that QbD relies on regulatory compliance rather than innova-
tion incentives, innovation will likely be limited to that specifically demanded by 
the FDA. The one incentive associated with QbD, and that most relevant to the 
procedural innovation barriers described above, is the possibility of regulatory 
flexibility. Unfortunately, that promise has so far proven illusory.374 
                                                                                                                           
 368 James, Davidson FDA Study on the Status of QbD Implementation in the Generic Industry, 
LACHMAN CONSULTANTS (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.lachmanconsultants.com/fda-study-on-the-
status-of-qbd-implementation-in-the-generic-industry.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/825R-DE3P. 
 369 Id. 
 370 Id. 
 371 Cox, supra note 122; Ted Fuhr & Katy George, Moving Beyond the Business Case for QbD, 
PHARMA QBD (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.pharmaqbd.com/mckinsey_beyond_business_case_qbd/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/P9Z5-7B6F. See generally Beth H. Junker, Building a Business Case for 
Biopharmaceutical QbD Implementation, 25 BIOPHARM INT’L 40 (2012) (proposing a model for ap-
plying QbD to biopharmaceutical products). 
 372 See supra notes 248–269 and accompanying text (discussing the safe harbor provision of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act). See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006) (providing that there is no patent 
infringement if the patented process or technology is only used to prepare submissions to the FDA so 
that generics may be released as soon as the patent expires). 
 373 See Cox, supra note 122. Roger Nosal of Pfizer stated, “One of the things that quality by de-
sign has not yielded for most of us is quantifiable value that companies have been willing to share, 
although we’ve seen bits and pieces from time to time.” Id. He went on to remark that “people are a 
little reluctant to say how much they’re saving by doing a quality-by-design approach.” Id. Similarly, 
Emil Ciurczak, the President of Doramaxx Consulting, writes, “The reason you don’t hear many hard-
core examples is that many companies consider QbD a competitive edge, so [they] don’t want to 
share—especially with generics.” Id. He further notes, “Thus, actual QbD successes are kept under 
better security than the recipe for Coca-Cola.” Id. 
 374 See infra notes 375–388 and accompanying text (explaining that QbD has failed to create 
regulatory flexibility to spur procedural innovation). 
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3. Regulatory Flexibility 
Allowing greater regulatory flexibility to reduce procedural barriers is a 
major possibility for improving innovation. This approach has been linked to 
QbD, but with little effect to date, as discussed below in Subsection 3.a.375 Regu-
latory flexibility, however, is an important potential solution on its own merits, 
as discussed below in Subsection 3.b.376 
a. Flexibility and QbD 
The FDA touted greater flexibility within predefined and well-characterized 
limits as an advantage of QbD. Rather than a process being defined as a set of 
rigid steps and measurements with minimum allowable deviation, QbD estab-
lishes a process “design space” —a set of parameters within which the firm 
knows the product being produced is high quality.377 Process changes within an 
FDA-approved design space should not require regulatory approval.378 This 
would allow innovation within a defined set of parameters without regulatory 
hurdles and would consequently enable more incremental innovation. 
Despite at least moderate progress adopting QbD, however, regulatory flex-
ibility has failed to materialize. Instead, FDA reviewers have challenged the type 
of risk-based regulatory filings expected by QbD—which emphasize tighter con-
trols on risk-linked processes but deemphasize non-risky processes—as insuffi-
ciently detailed.379 Even though top-level FDA policy may include regulatory 
flexibility in response to greater knowledge-based QbD filings, it appears that 
FDA actors on the ground—both approving filings and inspecting plants—have 
tended to follow the traditional patterns of review rather than adopt the intended 
additional flexibility.380 Given the significant discretion accorded to such front-
line regulators and industry reluctance to challenge exercises of that discre-
tion,381 implementing flexibility at the ground level may be particularly chal-
lenging. 
Policymakers themselves have recognized this failure to achieve regulatory 
flexibility. Dr. Janet Woodcock, Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and 
                                                                                                                           
 375 See infra notes 377–383 and accompanying text. 
 376 See infra notes 384–388 and accompanying text. 
 377 Yu, supra note 62, at 788–89. The design space is the multidimensional space which includes 
all combinations of parameters resulting in the desired final product. See id. The acceptable range of 
parameters varies based on the sensitivity of the process outcome to variation in that parameter. See id. 
Design space is more complex than a set of parameter ranges because different parameters can inter-
act; for instance, a process could be very sensitive to temperature in acidic environments but not in 
non-acidic ones. See id. 
 378 Id. at 789. 
 379 Eglovitch, supra note 40. 
 380 Telephone Interview with Hedley Rees, supra note 332. 
 381 See generally CARPENTER, supra note 137, at 635–62 (providing a detailed description of the 
dynamics between drug manufacturers and the FDA). 
548 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:491 
Research (“CDER”) at the FDA, recently remarked, “A quid pro quo people said 
would really sweeten the deal [was that] if in fact you did QbD, made that in-
vestment, then you would have a lot of freedom to operate afterward. I don’t 
think we have robustly achieved that goal . . . . [O]ver the past decade, the regu-
lations and the regulators have not really adapted that much.”382 FDA Commis-
sioner Margaret Hamburg reiterated this view in February 2013, stating, “[I]n a 
world where quality risk management is fully embraced, we could foresee a time 
when enhanced regulatory flexibility might be possible.”383 Thus, meaningfully 
implementing the regulatory flexibility associated with QbD would likely re-
quire greater adoption of QbD flexibility principles on the front line and renewed 
support for that flexibility from FDA policymakers, who now seem to describe it 
as a foregone possibility. 
b. Flexibility by Voluntary FDA Certification 
As an alternative to QbD, regulatory flexibility could come from a new 
program of voluntary FDA certification of certain manufacturing sites. For sites 
that consistently demonstrate quality performance above that required by regula-
tion, the FDA could approve increased regulatory flexibility. For example, major 
changes could be implemented with only notice, rather than preapproval.384 Such 
a program would allow manufacturers with a record of excellence and high qual-
ity production the regulatory flexibility to innovate and continuously improve; it 
would also provide an incentive to other manufacturers to innovate to achieve 
that level of excellence and receive the reward of flexibility. 
A system of certified regulatory flexibility would not be entirely novel, but 
would be new to drug manufacturing. The Occupational Safety and Health 
Agency (“OSHA”) runs a similar program, wherein worksites that demonstrate 
safety excellence may seek certification in the Voluntary Protection Programs, 
subject to renewal every three to five years.385 Although part of the program, the 
sites are exempt from programmed agency inspection and OSHA does not issue 
citations for promptly corrected violations observed during scheduled evalua-
tions.386 The agency, however, still investigates complaints and other significant 
events.387 Workplaces that participate in OSHA’s program have shown signifi-
                                                                                                                           
 382 Cox, supra note 122 (citing Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, Key-
note Address at the 2012 IQ Symposium (Dec. 5, 2012)). 
 383 Hamburg, supra note 112 (emphasis added). 
 384 See generally supra notes 171–183 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for 
postapproval filing with the FDA for major, moderate, and minor process changes). 
 385 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., DIRECTIVE NO. CSP-
03-01-003, OSHA INSTRUCTION 8 (2008), available at http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/
CSP_03-01-003.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q28Y-8KRP. 
 386 Id. at 8–10. 
 387 Id. 
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cant improvements in worker safety, product quality, and profits.388 A similar 
program in pharmaceutical manufacturing could offer potentially major benefits 
without significant regulatory burdens. 
4. Altered Regulatory Timelines 
Rather than relying solely on procedural or substantive reforms, the FDA 
could blend the two to change firms’ internal development incentives by requir-
ing significantly greater understanding of drug manufacturing parameters earlier 
in the development process. Currently, INDs in Phase I clinical trials can begin 
human testing with significantly less stringent requirements for cGMP and 
Chemistry and Manufacturing Controls (“CMCs”) than those required for Phase 
II or III trials or commercial sale.389 This allows firms to put off developing so-
phisticated knowledge of a drug’s manufacturing characteristics—such as how 
the drug can best be formulated, what inactive ingredients are most appropriate 
for final dosage forms, and how fast the drugs should dissolve—until clinical 
trials have already begun. The actual requirements for CMC and cGMP infor-
mation when beginning Phase I trials are quite low because the FDA is focused 
on guaranteeing safety, but not on other aspects of the drug’s eventual develop-
ment process, like the potential for high-quality manufacturing on a commercial 
scale.390 
If the FDA instead required that companies submit significant CMC and 
cGMP information with an IND, rather than just evidence of safety and some 
basic manufacturing controls, then firms would be forced to generate that addi-
tional information before beginning human trials. This would help avoid the cur-
rent process of locking-in inefficient manufacturing processes and supply chain 
dynamics.391 
One downside to this approach is the wasted time and money spent devel-
oping information about manufacturability for the vast majority of drugs that 
will never make it to market. There are two responses that lessen this concern. 
                                                                                                                           
 388 Brian Bennett & Norman Deitch, OSHA’s VPP: The Value of Participating, 52 PROF. SAFETY 
24, 27, 29 (2007). 
 389 INDs are still required to comply with § 501(a)(2)(B) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 
which mandates the use of current good manufacturing practices. See 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B) 
(2012). Under 21 C.F.R. § 210.2(c) (2013), however, drugs used in Phase I clinical trials need not 
conform to 21 C.F.R. § 211 (governing GMPs), unless the drug is also being used in Phase II or Phase 
III trials or has been marketed. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CGMP FOR PHASE 1 INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS 1 (2008), availa-
ble at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/ucm070273.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F377-F23K. 
 390 Telephone Interview with Hedley Rees, supra note 332; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., supra note 389, at 12 (“For some materials, all relevant attributes or acceptance crite-
ria may not be known at the phase 1 stage of product development.”). 
 391 REES, supra note 158, at 405–07. 
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First, although the total development attrition rate is very high, the relevant attri-
tion rate for this regulatory shift is from entry into Phase I trials—for which an 
IND is required but relatively little manufacturing understanding is required—to 
drugs entering Phase II trials—during which manufacturing information is fully 
developed and where cGMP regulations come into force. Thus, assuming that 
the information needs to be generated for drugs in Phase II, and considering that 
approximately 60% of drugs that enter Phase I trials make it to Phase II trials,392 
only 40% of information development costs will be for drugs which ultimately 
fail—a high fraction, but less than half.393 
Second, and mediating the first response, at least some attrition in the drug 
pipeline occurs for concerns related to manufacturing. In 2000, roughly 5% of 
drugs failed to proceed because they were too difficult to formulate and roughly 
10% failed because they were too expensive to manufacture.394 Because later 
phases of clinical development are significantly more expensive,395 determining 
earlier that a drug will be too costly to manufacture or too difficult to formulate 
can reduce costs later in the pipeline. Catching this problem earlier will partially 
offset the costs of generating unnecessary information for eventually unsuitable 
candidates.396 
This regulatory shift would mean that more manufacturing processes would 
be established on the basis of better information earlier in the drug development 
pipeline. Procedural requirements could thus overcome the current financial in-
centives to push off manufacturing development until absolutely necessary, less-
ening the substantive barriers of empiricism-based consistency requirements.397 
                                                                                                                           
 392 Kola & Landis, supra note 200, at 713 fig.1(b). 
 393 Approximately 20% of drugs make it from Phase I to Phase III. Id. 
 394 Id. at 714 fig.3. 
 395 See id. at 712. 
 396 The obvious question arises: If this approach would already save costs, why aren’t companies 
adopting it? One possibility is that the offset is only partial, in which case otherwise externalized so-
cial benefits of higher-quality manufacturing would need to be weighed against increased industry 
costs. Another factor is that firms face strong time pressures to commercialize a drug rapidly to max-
imize the period of patent-protected market exclusivity. Because the patent clock starts running early 
in development, firms may avoid generating additional manufacturing-related information before 
beginning human trials. The competitive features of this problem would be avoided if applied equally 
to all firms. If, on the other hand, requiring such a delay makes commercialization impracticable (by, 
for instance, unacceptably shortening the usable patent term), a patent-term extension could counter-
balance the regulation-based delay. 
 397 See generally supra notes 184–204 and accompanying text (discussing the substantive barriers 
to innovation posed by the FDA’s regulations). This approach could also help lessen the problem of 
mismatches in patent timing described earlier, see supra note 247; if understanding and innovation 
shift earlier in the drug development process, more of the lifetime of any resultant patents would occur 
during the patent-protected period when the innovative manufacturer controls the entire market. 
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5. A Separate Validation Pathway 
One final regulatory possibility could address the challenge of FDA reluc-
tance to adopt new technologies by creating a mechanism to validate new tech-
nologies detached from the drug approval process. As discussed above, the FDA 
has historically been reluctant to accept novel technologies, especially in the 
context of an NDA.398 As a result, because preapproval delay is extremely costly, 
firms avoid seeking approval in NDAs for novel manufacturing methods.399 This 
disincentive for manufacturing innovation can be reduced by allowing firms to 
introduce and validate novel techniques for the FDA separate from any particular 
NDA.400 
If firms can demonstrate to the FDA that novel manufacturing techniques 
function reproducibly and can be validated, then that demonstration could be 
relied upon by the FDA in any NDA or sNDA seeking to use the new technique. 
This would be particularly useful for broadly applicable techniques, like 
HPLC401 or, more currently, continuous manufacturing dynamically modulated 
by in-line measurements.402 Regulatory approval of a new technique could allay 
worries about including that technique in an NDA. Today, HPLC is used in es-
sentially all NDAs, but it took a long time and unusually persistent sponsors to 
achieve that result. An independent process for new technologies could speed 
and regularize that process. It could also shield FDA reviewers from risk-averse 
pressures to avoid novel techniques by decoupling them from the risks of new 
drugs.403 
A standalone validation process would also ideally be open to firms other 
than drug sponsors, such as contract manufacturing organizations (“CMOs”), 
equipment vendors, and manufacturers from other industries. The incentive for 
this regulatory effort would vary by sponsor: efficiency and quality gains from 
the new technology for a drug sponsor, potential equipment sales for a vendor, 
                                                                                                                           
 398 See supra notes 142–154 and accompanying text (analyzing the FDA’s preapproval barriers to 
innovation). 
 399 See CARPENTER, supra note 137, at 67–68. This problem exists principally for preapproval 
innovation, which would be incorporated into an NDA, because preapproval delay cuts into patent-
protected market exclusivity, whereas postapproval delays in implementing manufacturing innova-
tions do not. Restrictions on innovation preapproval, however, also limit the available possibilities for 
innovation postapproval through the procedural and substantive hurdles previously discussed. See 
generally supra notes 168–204 and accompanying text. 
 400 See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 151, at 147–48 (discussing making 
“dummy” submissions of new technologies to the FDA—including standard operating procedures—
unlinked to any particular NDA to avoid risk of regulatory delay). 
 401 See generally supra notes 142–154 and accompanying text (discussing the industry’s struggle 
to obtain FDA approval of HPLC). 
 402 See generally Jennifer Markarian, Process Analytical Technology and Process Control in Sol-
id-Dosage Manufacturing, 37 PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. 56 (2013) (noting that the industry is moving 
toward closed-loop control of continuous processing). 
 403 See CARPENTER, supra note 137, at 67–68. 
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potential clients for a CMO, or patent royalties for any of the above, but espe-
cially for manufacturers from other industries. Patent royalties or other manufac-
turing exclusivity incentives would provide even better incentives if the intellec-
tual property regime for manufacturing could be improved. 
B. Using Regulation to Change Innovation Incentives 
Although lowering regulatory barriers could make it easier to innovate, in-
centives are likely needed to drive optimal innovation past remaining barriers 
not present in other industries’ manufacturing sectors.404 Wide-reaching changes 
to the intellectual property system as a whole are both beyond the scope of this 
piece and unnecessary to address the industry-constrained problem of pharma-
ceutical manufacturing. The pervasive regulatory oversight in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, and the successful integration of regulation with patent incentives in 
drug discovery, however, suggest that regulatory structures could help improve 
intellectual property incentives for innovation. 
The drug industry is virtually unique in the close supervision of whether 
and how a product can be introduced. The costs of this supervision are large but 
accepted. Treating this industry oversight as a given, structural changes with po-
tentially tremendous benefits for innovation could be implemented with relative-
ly small changes and additional costs. Structural improvements could come in 
two major forms. First, as discussed in Subsection 1 of this Section, regulatory 
action could augment and change the functioning of the intellectual property 
system, using disclosure requirements to drive the industry from an opaque, 
trade secrecy-based system to a more transparent, patent-based system.405 Sec-
ond, as analyzed in Subsection 2 of this Section, an expansion of regulatory 
market exclusivity incentives for manufacturing innovation could parallel the 
                                                                                                                           
 404 It is also possible that regulatory reform alone might be sufficient. Market forces and industry 
dynamics will drive some innovative shifts; some studies have suggested that QbD adoption has been 
partially driven by business factors. See generally Fuhr & George, supra note 371; Junker, supra note 
371. Innovation theory, however, suggests that well-functioning innovation incentives are still neces-
sary, because firms’ inability to capture large portions of total innovation value results in underinvest-
ment in innovation from a social perspective. See K.J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of 
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 619, 623 (R.R. 
Nelson ed., 1962); Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams, Measuring the Social Return to R&D, 113 Q. 
J. ECON. 1119, 1134 (1998). This is likely particularly true for manufacturing innovation in the phar-
maceutical industry because consumers are relatively cost-insensitive and thus manufacturing costs 
can be passed on. Quality-increasing innovation may be extremely valuable socially but of relatively 
low value to manufacturers beyond the quality needed for regulatory approval of market entry because 
that additional quality, like manufacturing costs, is typically opaque to consumers. See infra notes 
426–444 and accompanying text (discussing consumers’ inability to detect drug quality). Incentives 
are therefore likely a necessary addition to regulatory improvements to drive socially preferable levels 
of manufacturing innovation. 
 405 See infra notes 407–418 and accompanying text. 
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existing intellectual property systems, much as regulatory exclusivity for drugs 
already parallels the patent system.406 
1. Mandatory Disclosure to Reshape Intellectual Property Incentives 
The major misalignment of intellectual property protection for pharmaceu-
tical manufacturing is the dominance of trade secrets over patents, which is driv-
en by the widespread and accurate perception that manufacturing patents are 
very difficult to enforce successfully.407 Trade secrets and patents on manufac-
turing methods are both difficult to enforce once the competitor is using the pro-
tected process, but trade secrets can keep competitors from getting the infor-
mation in the first place. If manufacturing patents were easier to observe and 
enforce, then firms could more easily rely on them to protect their innovation 
investments. This swap would trade a typically shorter monopoly period (be-
cause trade secrets can exist indefinitely) for easier enforcement upon observa-
tion of infringement,408 the possibility of greater damages on a finding of willful 
infringement,409 and an environment of easier cumulative innovation, both in-
firm and cross-firm.410 Increasing these incentives and allowing easier cumula-
tive innovation could help increase the efficiency and quality of pharmaceutical 
manufacturing. In addition, further industry benefits might arise from greater 
potential mobility of employees unburdened by nondisclosure agreements and 
consequent knowledge spillovers.411 Benefits to those outside the industry would 
include increased disclosure of whatever manufacturing innovations are generat-
                                                                                                                           
 406 See infra notes 419–425 and accompanying text. 
 407 See supra notes 223–269 and accompanying text (discussing patents in the pharmaceutical 
industry). 
 408 Proving misappropriation of trade secrets in court is very challenging, including proving that 
secrets were adequately protected and that misappropriation occurred instead of independent inven-
tion. See Gene Rzucidlo & Stefan Miller, Aggressive Intellectual Property Strategies, in BEST PRAC-
TICES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT: VALUATION, LICENSING, CASH FLOW, PHAR-
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note 286, at 61, 65. 
 409 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (providing that the court may award damages 
“adequate to compensate for the infringement”). 
 410 See generally Erkal, supra note 327 (examining the best trade secret policies for encouraging 
cumulative innovation); Scotchmer, supra note 31 (discussing the importance of continual improve-
ments on initial innovations); supra notes 326–331 and accompanying text (discussing structural dis-
advantages of a trade secret regime). 
 411 See generally Matt Marx et al., Regional Disadvantage? Non-Compete Agreements and Brain 
Drain (Nat’l Sci. Found., Working Paper, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=
1654719, archived at http://perma.cc/WFZ2-GDRU (arguing that noncompete agreements for em-
ployees prevent inventor mobility and cause good inventors to leave states that do enforce these 
agreements for states that do not). 
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ed, the possibility of greater manufacturing transparency, and the societal bene-
fits of increased cumulative innovation.412 
Fully addressing the mechanics of this larger cultural and intellectual prop-
erty regime shift is beyond the scope of this work. In brief, however, manufac-
turing practices would have to be significantly more transparent so that patent 
infringement could be detected and the patent subsequently enforced.413 Such 
transparency would demand a significant cultural shift in an industry currently 
dominated by secrecy, but could be significantly facilitated by the industry’s 
heavily regulated nature. Manufacturers must already notify the FDA of the de-
tails of their manufacturing procedures and are subject to FDA inspections. Alt-
hough actually enforcing manufacturing patents is well outside the scope of the 
FDA’s authority, making publically available the registered manufacturing tech-
niques and other manufacturing information currently maintained confidentially 
by the FDA would allow firms to police their patented techniques themselves. 
Such an approach would not be easy. In particular, there are significant statutory 
and potential constitutional problems with revealing information previously dis-
closed to the FDA confidentially.414 As a prospective solution for NDAs, AN-
DAs, and other manufacturing changes going forward, however, this idea faces 
fewer challenges. 
                                                                                                                           
 412 On the flip side, an increase in patenting could potentially stifle some other forms of innova-
tion which are currently developed in parallel, but are not blocked by patent concerns, because inde-
pendent invention is a defense against trade secret misappropriation actions but not patent infringe-
ment actions. DEAN RUSSELL ET AL., CHOOSING BETWEEN TRADE SECRET AND PATENT PROTECTION 
18, available at https://clients.kilpatricktownsend.com/IPDeskReference/Documents/Trade%20Secret
%20or%20Patent%20Protection.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/VE3N-XAZC. 
 413 If injunctive enforcement blocking cumulative innovation were a major worry, a mandatory-
licensing regime could be contemplated instead. Cf. eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 
(2006) (holding that permanent injunctive relief should issue in patent infringement cases only after a 
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 414 Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and Patents Under the 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285, 291–99 (2011). 
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trade secrecy regimes were not preempted by the federal patent system, but also noted: 
If a State, through a system of protection, were to cause a substantial risk that holders of 
patentable inventions would not seek patents, but rather would rely on the state protec-
tion, we would be compelled to hold that such a system could not constitutionally con-
tinue to exist. In the case of trade secret law no reasonable risk of deterrence from pa-
tent application by those who can reasonably expect to be granted patents exists. Trade 
secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the patent law. 
416 U.S. 470, 489–90 (1974). A colorable argument could be made, though it is outside the scope of 
this Article, that drug manufacturing processes—or even manufacturing processes in general—face 
weak enough protection under patent law that the availability of state trade secret protection actually 
deters innovators from seeking patent protection. If that were indeed the case, trade secret protection 
for those innovations might be constitutionally suspect, and mandatory disclosure of those innovations 
might not be a taking requiring compensation. Cf. id. 
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In fact, Congress has already mandated a limited version of this approach in 
the approval process for biosimilars as authorized by the Biologics Price Compe-
tition and Innovation Act of 2009 (“BPCIA”).415 The BPCIA created an abbrevi-
ated approval pathway for biosimilars, but within twenty days of the FDA’s ac-
ceptance of an application for a biosimilar, the applicant must provide a copy of 
the application to the reference product sponsor, including the method by which 
the biosimilar is manufactured.416 This information may only be viewed by the 
reference product sponsor’s counsel, may not be disclosed to other employees, 
and can be used only to determine potential patent infringement.417 This method 
of enforcing manufacturing patents is unlinked to the FDA’s safety and efficacy 
mandate. Instead, the FDA approval process facilitates enforcement of manufac-
turing patents by requiring disclosure to the most relevant patent-holder.418 In at 
least this context, transparency is already required to facilitate patent protection 
and enforcement. 
Changing from opacity to transparency would be a major shift for the in-
dustry. Nevertheless, manufacturers require more complex new technologies to 
manage and evaluate production, especially for biologics. Thus, broad and cu-
mulative innovation could well be worth the costs of mandated transparency. 
2. A Parallel Regulatory Exclusivity Regime for Manufacturing Innovation 
Rather than trying to shift the industry from a trade secrecy regime to a pa-
tent-based regime for manufacturing innovation, the FDA could administer a 
parallel set of market protection incentives that could be more carefully tailored 
to industry dynamics than patent or trade secrecy regimes. Currently, FDA mar-
ket protection is statutorily available only for innovations in drug discovery or 
development. The market protection regime could be congressionally expanded 
to include innovation in manufacturing. This parallel system could grant market 
protection, in the form of statutory market exclusivity, either to the innovative 
manufacturing process or to a related or unrelated drug. 
To address the less intuitive but more familiar solution first, the FDA could 
reward manufacturing innovations by granting an additional period of market 
exclusivity to a drug. The most straightforward form of this exclusivity would be 
                                                                                                                           
 415 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 804 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 262 (West 2011 & Supp. 
2013)). 
 416 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A). 
 417 Id. § 262(l)(1)(B)–(D). Unlike small-molecule drugs, for which patents are centrally registered 
in the Orange Book, patents on biologics are not registered. Dougherty, supra note 242, at 234. The 
BPCIA thus sets up a complex scheme in which the pioneer and follow-on manufacturers exchange 
information on relevant patents. Id.; see § 262(l). 
 418 This process creates an advantage for the reference product sponsor as against any other hold-
er of potentially relevant manufacturing process patents, which still face the standard difficulties en-
forcing their patents. 
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granting market exclusivity to the drug product for which the manufacturing in-
novation was designed. If, for instance, Pfizer discovered an innovative new way 
to manufacture higher-quality Lipitor, the FDA could extend Pfizer’s regulatory 
exclusivity on Lipitor by keeping generic Lipitor off the market for an additional 
period of time. This is the approach taken with pediatric clinical trials: a firm 
completing pediatric trials receives an additional six months of market exclusivi-
ty.419 Such a linked approach would be harder to apply to manufacturing innova-
tions that are not linked to a specific drug, like an improved technique for ensur-
ing tablet uniformity. That problem could be avoided by granting so-called 
“wild-card” extensions, which would allow the firm to apply regulatory exclu-
sivity to any drug in its portfolio.420 Such wild-card extensions have been previ-
ously suggested as regulatory prizes for different types of pharmaceutical inno-
vation.421 
There are significant concerns with product-based regulatory exclusivity, 
centered on appropriately valuing the innovation. For example, the FDA might 
have difficulty determining whether a manufacturing innovation is significant 
enough to merit the bonus of regulatory exclusivity. In addition, the FDA would 
need some mechanism of screening out useful innovations from marginal or in-
efficient innovations to avoid a situation where small manufacturing changes 
continually extend drug exclusivity. The appropriate length for such an extension 
would also be difficult to determine, though, for most drugs, even a very short 
extension might be enough to overcome the hurdles currently hindering innova-
tion. Furthermore, the value of the incentive may differ significantly by compa-
ny because the value of a fixed period of time depends on the market value of 
the drug; firms with higher-selling drugs would receive more value from the 
same period of exclusivity.422 These difficulties make product-based regulatory 
exclusivity a problematic form of innovation incentive. 
Alternately, regulatory exclusivity could be granted to the manufacturing 
innovation itself by preventing other firms from using the innovation for some 
period of time. Major manufacturing changes already require FDA approval be-
fore implementation. Thus, if a company demonstrated an innovative and useful 
major change in manufacturing, and the FDA approved it for that company, then 
the FDA could register the change and explicitly refuse to approve other compa-
                                                                                                                           
 419 See 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b) (2012); supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
 420 See Amy Kapczynski, Commentary: Innovation Policy for a New Era, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
264, 265–66 (2009). 
 421 See id. 
 422 Getting value from regulatory exclusivity also requires having drugs where regulatory exclu-
sivity would keep competitors off the market; firms whose drugs have strong and ongoing patent pro-
tection that would overlap with the period of regulatory exclusivity would receive less benefit from 
the exclusivity than firms without patent protection. 
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nies’ implementations of that change for a period of time.423 Once the exclusivity 
period expired, all pending manufacturing change applications to use the innova-
tive process could be automatically approved. 
Applying regulatory exclusivity to efficiency-based innovations seems rela-
tively unproblematic, though those innovations are most likely to be pursued as 
worthwhile even without outside incentives. Creating exclusivity for quality-
improving manufacturing innovation is initially harder to square with the FDA’s 
mission of ensuring high drug quality. If a manufacturing process increases the 
quality of a final drug product, it seems highly counterintuitive for the FDA to 
then prevent other manufacturers from using the same procedure. In other con-
texts, however, the FDA similarly prioritizes innovation incentives. For instance, 
pediatric studies are rewarded with exclusivity for the entire drug line, for all 
uses, not just pediatric uses.424 This drug-line exclusivity sacrifices access to a 
drug for the sake of more information for pediatric users.425 In the long run, in-
novation is judged to be worth the short-term sacrifice. 
Regulatory exclusivity for manufacturing innovation would avoid one of 
the key problems of manufacturing process patents: the difficulty of enforce-
ment. Because the FDA oversees pharmaceutical manufacturing, requires regis-
tration of manufacturing techniques, and preapproves major changes in manu-
facturing, the agency could readily prevent a firm from using a technique for 
which regulatory exclusivity had been granted. 
Regulatory exclusivity would not, however, avoid another major reason 
that actual patents—as opposed to regulatory “pseudo-patents”—fail to create 
adequate incentives for manufacturing innovation: the problem of public disclo-
sure to competitors. If manufacturing innovations require public disclosure to 
receive FDA regulatory exclusivity, then firms might avoid seeking that exclu-
sivity to avoid that disclosure. Avoiding disclosure is a key reason why patents 
are already ineffective. But, if FDA exclusivity occurs without public disclosure, 
then the social and industrial benefits of such disclosure are lost. 
Institutional competence is a much larger challenge. Applying regulatory 
exclusivity to manufacturing innovation would substantially extend the “pseudo-
patent” regime beyond the very discrete world of drug products and yes-or-no 
activities like the completion of pediatric trials or the approval of a new indica-
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tion. It would demand that the agency make hard judgments about which inno-
vation is enough to justify exclusivity, what the boundaries of an innovation are, 
what happens when two companies both seem to develop an innovation simulta-
neously, and what do to if one innovation incorporates another. These issues are 
all familiar ones, but are familiar in the context of patent law, where firms can 
rely on the expertise of the PTO and a large body of law developed by the feder-
al courts. The FDA currently lacks the institutional competence—and the man-
date—to develop a truly parallel pseudo-patent system alongside the actual pa-
tent regime. 
Overall, although market exclusivity is the traditional form of incentive for 
innovation, using either form of government-based exclusivity—patent or regu-
latory—is challenging for manufacturing innovations. Shifting from a secrecy-
based system of manufacturing innovation to a patent-based system is an intri-
guing and promising possibility, but demands systematic changes in transparen-
cy throughout the industry. Regulatory exclusivity seems a more straightforward 
fix, and it has been previously applied when incentives were needed for pharma-
ceutical companies. But applying such innovations to manufacturing innovation 
raises particularly challenging questions of valuation and institutional compe-
tence. 
C. Quality Indicators and Market Pressure 
Firm behavior is typically driven by market demand. Nevertheless, because 
the drug market is effectively unable to recognize or reward manufacturing qual-
ity, the market does not demand a particular quality of product.426 Janet Wood-
cock recently noted this in the context of drug shortages, specifically shortages 
of generic sterile injectables.427 A key reason for those shortages is that 
healthcare consumers (whether doctors, hospitals, or the group purchasing or-
ganizations that act as middlemen in many drug markets) are unable to discern 
differences in quality between the products of different manufacturers.428 Be-
cause all generic versions of a drug are required to have “the same efficacy and 
side effect profiles,” buyers consider the drugs to be perfect substitutes and as-
sume that “the products are of sufficient quality if they are on the market.”429 
                                                                                                                           
 426 Woodcock & Wosinska, supra note 72, at 171–72. 
 427 Id. at 171. 
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 429 Id. In addition, in the specific markets analyzed, quality may be especially difficult to measure 
after the fact. In many markets, even if there is no ex ante way for consumers to differentiate products 
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product failure. Sterile injectable and infusible drugs, however, are usually administered to patients 
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Accordingly, drug contamination events are difficult to differentiate from infections that might other-
wise occur in the treated population. Id. Most healthcare providers do not look to manufacturing prod-
ucts when they observe infections in, for instance, the cancer patients treated with a chemotherapy 
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Accordingly, manufacturers compete only on price, not on quality, resulting in 
nonrobust manufacturing procedures prone to breakdowns and causing shortag-
es.430 
This lack of quality competition is hard for consumers, insurers, and the 
FDA itself to detect. Microbial contamination, in particular, can be episodic and 
non-uniform;431 a poorly maintained or designed production line may only in-
termittently introduce contamination, which may itself be relatively benign or 
very harmful.432 Thus, traditional after-the-fact sampling protocols performed by 
the manufacturer and reviewed by the FDA may miss sources of contamina-
tion.433 Contributing to the lack of regulatory incentives for maintaining the 
highest quality standards, the FDA’s response to contamination events is fre-
quently tempered by its desire to avoid drug shortages.434 Thus, manufacturers 
face both a market that is approximately indifferent to quality—because quality 
is hard to observe—and one that has a regulatory structure that can only occa-
sionally detect quality problems and that imposes a restrained response.435 
As a result of this market and regulatory insensitivity to quality, “short-
sighted firms [have] an incentive to manufacture under a minimum level of con-
trol.”436 Many manufacturers therefore “minimize quality system invest-
ments.”437 
To cope with the lack of quality awareness, particularly in the market, Dr. 
Woodcock suggests that “[the] FDA could support buyers and payers in their 
purchase and reimbursement decisions by providing them with meaningful man-
ufacturing quality metrics.”438 Such metrics would be analogous to the use of 
                                                                                                                           
regime of (assumed-to-be) sterile injectable drugs, assuming—correctly—that such manufacturing 
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scorecards for Health Management Organizations (“HMOs”)439 or grades given 
to restaurants by health inspectors.440 They would demonstrate quality above that 
required by cGMP regulations.441 The FDA is currently planning to create a drug 
quality program implemented by a newly instituted Office of Pharmaceutical 
Quality within CDER.442 
Although this idea has significant potential, it might have limited effects on 
manufacturing innovation. Even regulator-enforced quality grades might not be 
transparent to the consumer. As in many aspects of healthcare, the question of 
who exactly constitutes the market-oriented consumer is nontrivial. In retail set-
tings, consumers might pay a premium for drugs with a prominent signal of 
high-quality manufacturing and avoid those with a low-quality signal, changing 
market incentives. Institutional purchasers (who dominate the market for many 
drugs with the most prevalent manufacturing quality issues), however, may not 
be concerned about minor differences in quality as long as the firm has met the 
FDA’s marketability threshold. Because FDA certification provides a basic 
quality guarantee, liability would be unlikely to result from failing to pay a pre-
mium for additional manufacturing quality.443 This institutional lack of participa-
tion is especially likely to be true if quality metrics are not transparent to the fi-
nal consumers. If patients, as now, are given drugs removed from their initial 
packaging and dispensed through a hospital’s pharmacy system, the quality sig-
nals present in retail packaging would be absent at the time of use. Institutions 
could therefore freely prioritize lower cost over paying a quality premium. 
This approach could be modified to give greater industry incentives by lev-
eraging the dynamic between brand and generic companies. If, in the drug ap-
proval process, a firm could commit to higher quality standards—say, a +/–1% 
variation in active ingredient, rather than the typically permitted +/–10%—that 
commitment could be added to the label and thus become enforceable by the 
FDA. As a natural consequence, any firm seeking approval to market a generic 
version of the drug would have to match that commitment and meet the same 
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quality standard. This would allow firms to erect a quality barrier to generic en-
try. Previous work has shown that fewer generics compete for hard-to-
manufacture formulations.444 This approach creates incentives for both branded 
and generic manufacturers to increase manufacturing quality, without relying on 
consumer or insurer preferences to generate those incentives. To limit generic 
entry, branded-drug makers would need to invest in higher-quality manufactur-
ing. And generic companies, to avoid exclusion from the market, would need to 
invest as well. Consumers would receive higher quality drugs, both from the 
brand company and from any compliant generics. This benefit would, of course, 
need to be measured against potentially higher generic prices arising from de-
creased or delayed generic entry. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that studies of innovation policy in the pharmaceu-
tical industry at the policy level and in academia have, until now, missed a cru-
cial piece of the industry puzzle: the costs and complexities of pharmaceutical 
manufacturing. This gap in theory, which this Article seeks to remedy, has had 
major practical consequences. A combination of regulatory policy with several 
barriers to manufacturing innovation and an intellectual property regime poorly 
aligned to incentivize innovation results in tens to hundreds of billions of dollars 
in lost social economic welfare, in addition to major human costs from drug 
shortages and recalls. 
This Article identifies as the principal cause of these problems a gap in in-
novation theory and policy in manufacturing processes, particularly in the phar-
maceutical industry. New products must be made and distributed for society to 
receive their benefit. Although society assumes that manufacturing and distribu-
tion are straightforward, the case of the pharmaceutical industry demonstrates 
that this assumption is not always true. Profoundly problematic consequences 
arise when regulations and incentives actively hinder manufacturing innovation. 
Legal rules that work to drive innovative product development may not work for 
manufacturing, and for drug manufacturing—a single example, but one of tre-
mendous importance to the economy and to public health—those legal rules sig-
nificantly slow innovation. 
This policy gap regarding different forms of innovation, however, is ame-
nable to new solutions in the form of regulatory shifts. Discovery and develop-
ment of new drugs is a paradigm area where regulation is actively shaped to en-
courage innovation, and manufacturing those drugs is another area for regulation 
to press forward. A parallel system of intellectual property incentives, or more 
drastic changes that shift the way already existing incentives function in the in-
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dustry, are two major possibilities. Other options may also be proposed once the 
role of regulation in directly managing innovation is more fully appreciated. 
Such approaches are not limited to the pharmaceutical industry, though they may 
now be palatable or even conceivable only in that industry, given its unusually 
heavily regulated nature. Thus, these methods suggest new ways of using regula-
tory levers for innovation in other contexts, especially substantively related in-
dustries with tight regulation, like medical devices or biomedical diagnostics. 
There is an ongoing debate over the role of different intellectual property forms 
in balancing initial innovation investments against restrictions on following in-
novation. In this context, the possibilities of altering which intellectual property 
form dominates in a particular industry, or of using administrative forms to gen-
erate new innovation incentives, may have far-reaching implications. 
